Researchers in Schools



Who Killed Patrice Lumumba?

Pupil Name

Coursebook Designed by **Dr. Nathaniel Powell**

UNI PATHWAYS

RESEARCHERS IN SCHOOLS

Timetable and Assignment Submission

Timetable – Tutorials

Tutorial	Date	Time	Location
1	2 December, 2019	Noon	Senate House Library, University of London
2	10 January 2020	3:15 PM	TBD
3	17 January 2020	3:15 PM	TBD
4	24 January 2020	3:15 PM	TBD
5	31 January 2020	3:15 PM	TBD
6 (Feedback)	28 February 2020	3:15 PM	TBD
7 (Feedback)	20 March 2020	3:15 PM	TBD

Timetable – Homework Assignments

Homework Assignment	Description	Due Date
Tutorial 1	Belgian Colonialism in Congo 1885-1960	16 December 2019
Tutorial 2	Independence and Crisis	17 January 2020
Tutorial 3	The United Nations	24 January 2020
Tutorial 4	Plots against Lumumba	31 January 2020
Tutorial 5	First draft of final assessment	13 February 2020

Assignment Submission – Lateness and Plagiarism

Lateness	
Submission after 13 March 2020	10 marks deducted
Plagiarism	
Some plagiarism	10 marks deducted
Moderate plagiarism	20 marks deducted
Extreme plagiarism	Automatic fail

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Course Rationale

This course focuses on the events leading to the **assassination** of Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba in January 1961. Already an **icon** of African struggles against **colonial rule**, his death provoked widespread protests throughout the world, and cemented his reputation as a **martyr** for the cause of African liberation. This took place in the broader context of Congo's messy independence from Belgium, civil war, foreign interventions, and political infighting. The ongoing Cold War between the **capitalist** Western bloc, led by the United States, and the **communist** East headed by the Soviet Union, exacerbated the Congolese conflict and turned it into an international crisis.

Lumumba stood at the center of this storm. As the country's Prime Minister and leader of a political party determined to assert national unity and independence, he had many enemies. In Western countries, particularly Belgium, the United States, and Britain, **policymakers** feared that Lumumba's **strident** anti-colonialism and nationalism would lead him to **ally** with the Soviet Union, and that communism might spread into Africa. For these countries, Lumumba posed a potential threat to world peace and international security. Lumumba also had many enemies inside Congo itself. His advocacy of national unity scared Congolese politicians who promoted **regionalism** or **secession**, particularly in the province of Katanga which declared its independence from Congo just days after Congo's own independence.

This course will examine how all these forces became involved, in one way or another, in the **circumstances** that led to Lumumba's arrest and assassination. It will begin with a look at the bloody history of Belgium's brutal rule in Congo. Then it will discuss the factors which led to Congo's independence in 1960, followed by an examination of the **internationalization** of Congo's political crisis. Students will learn about the role of the **United Nations** in sending a **peacekeeping mission** and the main interests of the United States and Belgium in shaping Congo's political destiny. Finally, the course will look at how all of these elements came together in the process leading to Lumumba's death.

In doing so, students will examine a range of **primary sources** and **secondary sources** to analyze questions of **causation.** The course will also look at wider questions with continuing **relevance**, such as the drivers of **foreign policy, military interventions,** and civil wars.

Source: Lumumba Indépendance—TKM 1972

Uni Pathways Mark Scheme 2019 – Essay-based assignments

	Skills	1st (70-100)	2:1 (60-69)	2:2 (50-59)	3rd (40-49)	Mark /100
Subject knowledge	Knowledge and understanding	o All content included and materials used are relevant to the general topic and to the specific question/title o Good understanding of all the relevant topics. o Technical terms are defined and used accurately throughout o Clear justification of how the material and content included is related to the specific issues that are the focus of the assignment	o Most of the materials used and content included are relevant to the general topic and to the specific question/title o Good understanding of most the relevant topics o Technical terms are mostly defined and used accurately o Adequate justification of how the material used and content included are related to the specific issues that are the focus of the essay	o Some of the materials used and content included are relevant to the general topic and to the specific question/title o Good understanding on some of the relevant topics but occasional confusion on others o Technical terms are sometimes used and defined accurately o Some justification of how the material used and content included are related to the specific issues that are the focus of the essay	o The content included and materials used are not applied to the question/title in a relevant manner o There is confusion in how understanding of the topics is expressed	
Critical thinking	Research and evidence	o Includes rich sources of research findings, data, quotations or other sourced material as evidence for the claims/ideas o Uses evidence/calculations to support claims/assertions/ideas, consistently clearly and convincingly o Evidence of further reading beyond materials provided which were used in an appropriate context	o Includes adequate sources of research findings, data, quotations or other sourced material as evidence for the claims/ideas o Uses evidence/calculations to support claims/assertions/ideas, mostly clearly and convincingly o Evidence of further reading beyond materials provided	o Includes some sources of research findings, data, quotations or other sourced material as evidence for the claims/ ideas o Uses evidence/calculations to support claims/assertions/ideas, at times clearly and convincingly o Limited evidence of further reading beyond materials provided	o Inclusion sources and materials is very limited and mostly not attributed o Applicable sources are rarely used to support ideas.	
	Developing an argument	o A point of view or position in relation to the title or question is consistently clear. The position is developed effectively and consistently throughout the essay o Argument is exceptionally well-developed and well-justified o Makes links effectively between subjects that have not previously been associated o Uses concepts from the tutorials in an unfamiliar context and does so accurately and confidently. o Content is analysed effectively to support the argument	o A point of view or position in relation to the title or question is adequately clear. The position is well-developed in most of the essay o Argument is clear and well-developed, and position is justified o Some evidence of linking subjects that have not previously been associated o Uses some concepts from the tutorials in an unfamiliar context, but not always accurately o Analyses content to support the argument	o A point of view or position in relation to the title or question is somewhat clear. The position is well-developed in parts of the essay o Argument is clear but not well-developed o Limited evidence of linking subjects that have not previously been associated o Limited use of concepts from the tutorials in other contexts o Uses some analysis of content to support the argument	o There is not a clear point of view or position taken and sometimes the argument is not clearly established	

	Critical evaluation	○ Moves beyond description to an assessment of the value or significance of what is described ○ Evaluative points are consistently explicit/systematic/reasoned/justified ○ Effectively critiques the reliability of sources provided	○ Mostly description but some assessment of the value or significance of what is described ○ Evaluative points are mostly explicit/systematic/reasoned/justified ○ Some evidence of critiques on the reliability of sources provided	○ Describes with minimal assessment of the value or significance of what is described ○ Evaluative points are at times explicit/systematic/reasoned/justified ○ Limited evidence of critiques on the reliability of sources provided	○ The work is descriptive in nature and there is a lack of critical engagement in the value of sources	
Written communication	Structure and presentation	○ Ideas are presented in paragraphs and arranged in a logical structure that is appropriate for the assignment ○ The introduction clearly outlines how the essay/report will deal with the issues ○ The conclusion summarises all the main points clearly and concisely ○ All sources are referenced correctly in an agreed format	○ Ideas are presented in paragraphs and arranged in a structure that is mostly appropriate for the assignment ○ The introduction adequately describes how the essay/report will deal with the issues ○ The conclusion summarises most of the main points clearly ○ Most sources are referenced correctly in an agreed format	○ Ideas are presented in paragraphs and arranged in a structure ○ The introduction mentions how the essay/report will deal with the issues ○ The conclusion summarises some of the main points clearly ○ Some sources are referenced correctly in the agreed format with occasional errors	○ Ideas are presented in paragraphs but there is a lack of structure in how the work is presented ○ The work lacks an introduction that establishes the scope of the question ○ The work lacks a conclusion that summarise the main points raised ○ Work is not referenced accurately	
	Language and style	○ No spelling, grammar or punctuation errors ○ Writing style consistently clear, tone appropriate and easy to follow ○ Accurate and consistent use of technical language and vocabulary	○ Minimal spelling, grammar or punctuation errors ○ Writing style mostly clear, tone appropriate and easy to follow ○ Some attempts of using technical language and vocab alary, but not always accurate	○ Some spelling, grammar or punctuation errors ○ Writing style moderately clear, tone appropriate and easy to follow ○ Use of simple language and vocabulary effectively but struggles to use technical language	○ There are a significant number of spelling, grammar and punctuation errors ○ Use of simple language and vocabulary effectively but a lack of technical language	
Overall Mark (average of the 6 marks from the criteria above)						

Baseline Assignment (essay based): Pupil Feedback Report

Name of Pupil	
Name of School	
Name of RIS teacher	
Title of Assignment	

How your assignment is graded:

Grade	Marks	What this means
1st	70+	Performing to an excellent standard at A-level
2:1	60-69	Performing to a good standard at A-level
2:2	50-59	Performing to an excellent standard at GCSE
3rd	40-49	Performing to a good standard at GCSE
Working towards a pass	0-39	Performing below a good standard at GCSE
Did not submit	DNS	No assignment received by The Brilliant Club

Lateness	
Any lateness	10 marks deducted
Plagiarism	
Some plagiarism	10 marks deducted
Moderate plagiarism	20 marks deducted
Extreme plagiarism	Automatic fail

Marks

OVERALL MARK / 100		FINAL MARK / 100 (including any deductions)	
DEDUCTED MARKS		FINAL GRADE	

If marks have been deducted (e.g. late submission, plagiarism) the teacher should give an explanation in this section:

Mark Breakdown and Feedback

Knowledge and Understanding		Research and Evidence	
	mark		*mark*
Developing an Argument		**Critical Evaluation**	
	mark		*mark*
Structure and Presentation		**Language and Style**	
	mark		*mark*

Final Assignment (essay based): Pupil Feedback Report

Name of Pupil	
Name of School	
Name of RIS teacher	
Title of Assignment	

How your assignment is graded:

Grade	Marks	What this means
1st	70+	Performing to an excellent standard at A-level
2:1	60-69	Performing to a good standard at A-level
2:2	50-59	Performing to an excellent standard at GCSE
3rd	40-49	Performing to a good standard at GCSE
Working towards a pass	0-39	Performing below a good standard at GCSE
Did not submit	DNS	No assignment received by The Brilliant Club

Lateness	
Any lateness	10 marks deducted
Plagiarism	
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Marks

OVERALL MARK / 100		FINAL MARK / 100 (including any deductions)	
DEDUCTED MARKS		FINAL GRADE	

If marks have been deducted (e.g. late submission, plagiarism) the teacher should give an explanation in this section:

Mark Breakdown and Feedback

Knowledge and Understanding		Research and Evidence	
	mark		*mark*
Developing an Argument		**Critical Evaluation**	
	mark		*mark*
Structure and Presentation		**Language and Style**	
	mark		*mark*

Subject Vocabulary

Word	Definition	In a sentence
Colonialism	The control or domination of one country or people by another.	The Congolese suffered enormously under Belgian colonialism.
Decolonization	The movement and process of ending colonialism.	The late 1950s and early 1960s saw most African countries gain their independence, making it the golden age of African decolonization.
Cold War	A global political, economic, and ideological struggle between two groups of countries led by the United States and the Soviet Union.	The Cold War between the world's two most powerful countries, the United States and the Soviet Union, meant that other countries felt pressured to choose which side to join.
Economy	The part of society dealing with the production and circulation of goods and money.	Katanga's rich copper mines formed a key part of Congo's economy.
Secession	When one part of a country breaks away to form another country.	In July 1960, Congo's southern province of Katanga decided to break away to form its own country, thus beginning the Katangan Secession.
United Nations	A global organization of most of the world's nations founded in 1945 aiming to prevent war and improve cooperation between countries.	Lumumba placed enormous hope in the United Nations to help resolve some of Congo's conflicts.
Peacekeeping	Soldiers sent by the United Nations or other international organizations to a country in conflict to help end a war or prevent one from starting again.	The peacekeeping operation deployed by the United Nations in Congo failed to prevent conflict in the country.
Ideology	The way people see and interpret the world around them, especially about issues of power, politics, and economics.	American views of Lumumba were strongly influenced by their anti-communist ideology.
Foreign Policy	The ways in which political leaders in one country decide to act with other countries.	American foreign policy during the 1960s was driven by fear of the activities and abilities of the Soviet Union.

Tutorial 1 – Belgian Colonialism in Congo 1885-1960



King Leopold II of Belgium, reigned 1865-1909

What is the Purpose of Tutorial 1?

- Understand the concept of colonialism
- Understand Belgian colonialism in Congo
- Explain key tensions in the colonial regime

Write down three reasons why you think European countries would have wanted to control territories in Africa.

1)
2)
3)

Map 1

European Possessions before the 1884-1885 Berlin Conference and the "Scramble for Africa."

Map 2



European Possessions at the beginning of the First World War

Map 3



Congo after King Leopold II established his rule over the territory

Maps

Look at the maps above. Think, pair, share, and discuss. What kind of story do they tell about the impact of colonialism? What do most of them ignore? Who do you think drew them and what does this tell us about these sources? Compare the Congo map to the map below. Jot down some of your thoughts.



A map of the Congo region before colonization.

In the 1880s, European countries had begun competing for territories in Africa. Fearing that this could eventually lead to a war, German Chancellor [Prime Minister] Otto von Bismarck held a conference of European countries and the United States in Berlin, lasting from 1884-1885, to decide upon the rules and principles of colonization in Africa. The conference also agreed to give a large portion of central Africa to the Belgian King, Leopold II, as a personal possession—outside the control of the actual Belgian government. Compared to powerful states like Britain and France, Leopold had few resources and little authority. The reason he got the territory was because all of the other European colonizers feared the consequences if one of their competitors took control of this region. A weak king of a weak European country though, posed little threat, and this allowed Leopold to singlehandedly take control of a colony the size of Western Europe, which he soon named the Congo Free State.

Activity

Read any 3 of the following sources on life in Leopold's Congo, and write a paragraph about the methods Leopold used to rule over the territory.

The Casement Report
"They had endured such ill-treatment at the hands of the Government officials and soldiers that nothing had remained but to be killed for failure to bring in rubber or to die in their attempts to satisfy the demands."

The Casement Report
"Why do you catch the women and not the men?"
"If I caught the men who would work the rubber? But if I catch the wives…the rubber is brought in quickly."

The Casement Report
"The population of the lake-side towns would seem to have diminished within the last ten years by 60 or 70 percent. It was in 1893 that the effort to levy an india rubber imposition [tax] in this district was begun, and for some four or five years this imposition could only be collected at the cost of continual fighting. Finding the task of collecting india rubber a well-nigh impossible one, the authorities abandoned it in this district, and the remaining inhabitants now deliver a weekly supply of foodstuffs for the up-keep of the military camp at Irebu, of the big coffee plantation at Bikoro."

A Congolese interviewed by Casement
"When the soldiers were sent to make us cut rubber there were so many killed we got tired of burying."

A refugee from the rubber-producing regions, interviewed by Casement
"We had to go further and further into the forest to find the rubber vines, to go without food, and our women had to give up cultivating the fields and gardens. Then we starved. Wild beasts—leopards—killed some of us when we were working away in the forest, and others got lost or died from exposure and starvation, and we begged the white man to leave us alone, saying that we could get no more rubber, but the white men and their soldiers said: 'Go! You are only beasts yourselves.'"

U.U., a Congolese interviewed by Casement
"As we fled, the soldiers killed ten children, in the water. They killed a lot of adults, cut off their hands, put them in baskets, and took them to the white man, who counted 200 hands…. One day, soldiers struck a child with a gun-butt, cut off its head, and killed my sister and cut off her head, hands and feet because she had on rings."

Village headman to Reverend Harris, a British missionary
"Tell them [the rubber agents] that we cannot and therefore will not find rubber; we are willing to spend our strength at any work possible, but the rubber is finished. If we must either be massacred or bring rubber, well, let them kill us; then we suppose they will be satisfied."

Testimony by a Congolese given to Rev. A.E. Schrivener
"I myself saw a man at Likange who had had both his hands cut off. Sometimes they cut them at the wrist, sometimes farther up…with a machete. Also there was Muboma…who has a long scar across the back of his neck. There is another man called Botei at Inanga with the same sort of scar, where they wounded him maliciously, expecting him to die. They didn't cut his head off, they didn't get to the bone, but expected him to bleed to death. It was sheer cruelty; the State treated us abominably."
Chewema, a member of the Mahusi community

Leonard Arthur, British Vice-Consul for the Congo, 1896
"I have also ascertained, from a purely private source of information, that Captain Francqui was in the habit of sending out small parties of troops under a non-commissioned officer to the villages and neighborhoods for the purpose of demanding ivory and rubber. If these articles were not forthcoming, he would dispatch another armed party to attack the natives. On the return of the party the non-commissioned officer in charge would report that so many natives had been killed. This, however, would not satisfy Captain Francqui, who demanded proofs in the form of human hands that he number stated had been killed, and the armed part would again be sent out for this purpose, returning in due course with the right hands of the natives who had been killed, and having seized whatever ivory and india-rubber that could be found in the village."

Edvard Sjöblom, a Swedish missionary
"They often kill the Congolese for the sake of rubber. Once, a soldier, pointing to a basket, said to me: 'look, only two hands! That's nothing. A few days ago I brought the white man 160 hands and they were thrown in the river.' As he spoke I saw the horrible sight of dead bodies hanging down from the branches into the water."

John Weeks, a British missionary
"Last week I returned from spending eight days in the Bokongo, Bongondo and other towns below this, our station at Monsembe, and while there I learned of the killing by Mabata [the native name of a Belgian officer] and his soldiers of twenty-two men and women. And what was the crime of which these unfortunate folk were guilty? They were behind in their taxes, and owed the State between them a few goats."

John Weeks, a British missionary
"The cutting off of hands, I do not know from whom the order emanates. But this I know. There are victims who have survived the cruelty in every district, in some more than others. I know White men who have seen the baskets of hands being carried to the central State Station and others have told me of the hands being put in a line or lines. State soldiers themselves give as their reasons for this barbarous deed that '...they have to account for the use of the cartridges in this way.'"

Mrs. Banks, a missionary
"[I] saw a native sentry beating and loudly abusing a poor woman who was crossing the station with a basket on her back. On investigating the cause of the disturbance [I] found that the basket was full of hands which had been cut off in one of the rubber palaver, and that instead of nineteen hands only eighteen could be found, the woman having dropped one en route. [I] counted the smoked hands, and found some of them to belong to children, others to women, and to men. Many of the victims were relations of the poor creature who was bearing the basket to the local agent."

Mr. Yule, a missionary
"In the daytime they (the women) do all the usual station work, such as carrying water for the Government officials, cleaning their rooms, etc., etc., and during the night they are obliged to be at the disposal of the soldiers. The soldier must live with the woman as long as he is at the station; should he be removed, the woman must remain at the station whether she has children by him or not. The women are slaves captured by the Government soldiers when raiding the country, they are there to facilitate the ordinary requirements of labor, and to prevent the soldiers from their usual customs of raping in the native villages."

An anonymous missionary
"In stations in the charge of white government officers, one sees strings of poor emaciated old women, some mere skeletons, working in gangs, with a rope round their necks and connected with a rope 1 1/2 yards apart…thousands of Congolese have been slaughtered in Equateur. Twenty one severed heads, brought to Captain Rom, were used by him as decoration round the front of his house."


King Leopold II of Belgium

Although the "General Act of the Berlin Conference" called on all its signatories to end slavery and promote free trade, this did not exclude brutal rule, or the use of forced labor---often a form of slavery in all but name. Leopold had far more interest in making money than in governing his territory. To exploit important natural resources such as ivory or rubber, the agents Leopold hired to run his colony used enormous amounts of violence. Though Leopold eventually made tremendous amounts of money, the **oppressive** nature of his **regime** in Congo eventually provoked a major international outcry. After sustained pressure from the press, human rights advocates, and the general public, Leopold agreed to pass control of his colony over to the Belgian government in 1908.

Official Belgian rule ended some of the worst abuses of Leopold's regime. It prided itself on the spread of the Christian religion, the promotion of primary education, and the development of a wealthy mining industry in Congo's Katanga province. However, the Congolese people never benefited from the same rights and privileges as their Belgian masters. A Congolese could never be the boss of a Belgian, nor go to the same restaurants or cinemas. They also had limited access to higher education. Belgian rule was deeply racist, and by the 1950s, as activists throughout Africa were working to try to end colonial rule in French, British and Portuguese colonies, the Congolese began to organize for their freedom too.

A 100 franc banknote from Belgian Congo

Baseline assignment title: Belgian rule in Congo

Instructions: On June 30 1960, Congo gained its independence from Belgium. Read the below speech given by Baudouin, the King of Belgium, on that day. Write a 500 word essay **addressing the following points:** What kind of story does Baudouin tell about Belgian colonialism? What might this tell us about Belgian views of Congo? How does it compare with the evidence we've read on Belgian rule in Congo? Feel free to use other sources in this booklet in support of your arguments.

Baudouin's Speech:

Mr. President,
Sirs,
The independence of the Congo is formed by the outcome of the work conceived by King Leopold II's genius, undertaken by Him with tenacious and continuous courage with Belgium's perseverance. It marks a decisive hour in the destinies not only of the Congo itself, but, I do not hesitate to affirm, of the whole of Africa.

Over the course of 80 years, Belgium sent the best of its sons to our soil, first to deliver the basin of the Congo from the odious slave trafficking that decimated its populations; then to bring ethnic groups together with one another who, once enemies, learned to build the greatest of independent African States together; finally, to call for a happier life in the diverse regions of the Congo that you represent here, united by the same Parliament....

The Congo was equipped with railroads, roads, air and maritime routes that, in putting your populations in contact with one another, have favored their unity and have enlarged the country to the dimensions of the world.

A medical service, which has taken several decades to be established, was patiently organized and has delivered you from sicknesses, however devastating. Numerous and remarkably usefully hospitals have been built. Agriculture was improved and modernized. Large cities have been built and, across the whole country, living and hygienic conditions have translated into remarkable progress. Industrial enterprises have made the natural riches of the soil valuable. The expansion of economic activity has been considerable, also raising the well-being of your populations and equipping the Country with technicians indispensable to its development.

Thanks to mission schools, like those who create public powers, basic education has known an enviable growth; an intellectual elite has begun to form so that your universities will rapidly grow....

We are happy to have also given to the Congo, despite the greatest hardships, the elements needed to arm a country on the path of development.

...Facing the unanimous desires of your populations, we have not hesitated to recognize you your independence from this time on.
It is up to you now, Sirs, to demonstrate that we were right to trust you.

Henceforth, Belgium and the Congo find one another side by side, like sovereign States but linked by friendship and dedicated to help one another out....

Your followers will know the difficult task of governing. One must put first on the agenda their worries, whatever be their political party affiliation, the general interests of the country. They will have to teach the Congolese people that independence cannot be realized by immediate satisfaction of easy pleasures, but by work, by respect of liberty of others and by the rights of the minority, by tolerance and order, without which no democratic regime can survive.

I will give here a particular tribute to the Force Publique that accomplished its heavy mission with unwavering courage and devotion.

Independence will necessitate efforts and sacrifices from all. You must adapt institutions to your conceptions and your needs, in such a manner to render them stable and balanced. You must also...intensify intellectual and moral formation of the population, maintain the stability of the currency, safeguard and develop your economic, social, and, financial organizations.

Do not compromise the future with hasty reforms, and do not replace the structures that Belgium has given you, as long as you are not certain that you cannot do better....

Do not fear turning yourselves towards us. We are ready to stay by your side to help you with our advice, to shape with you technicians and functionaries (government employees) that you will need....
The whole world has fixed its eyes on you. At the hour where the Congo sovereignty chooses its way of life, I hope that the Congolese people conserve and develop the patrimony of spiritual, moral, and religious values that we share and that transcend the political vicissitudes and the differences in race or in border.

Remain united, and you will know to show yourself deserving the great role that you have been called to play in the history of Africa.

Congolese people,

My country and I recognize you with joy and emotion that the Congo attains this 30th of June 1960, in full agreement and friendship with Belgium, to independence and international sovereignty.

May God protect the Congo!

King Baudouin giving his Independence Day speech. President Kasavubu is seated on the right.

Baseline Assignment Success Criteria

Knowledge and understanding	Effectively convey an understanding of Baudouin's message and use this to answer the questions posed in the instructions.
Research and evidence	Show that you have read Baudouin's speech.
Developing an argument	Give reasons and evidence to back up the points that you make. You might find the PEE structure helpful: Point – make the key point clear Evidence – explain the evidence for the point Explanation – explain why your point is relevant and important
Critical evaluation	Explain how Baudouin's words and general message relate to the other sources we have looked at in the tutorial.
Structure and presentation	Organise your ideas in paragraphs with a logical structure Include an introduction that clearly outlines what the assignment will contain.
Language and style	Make sure your spelling, grammar and punctuation are accurate. Use a formal style of writing that is appropriate for an academic essay.

Tutorial 2 – Independence and Crisis

Independence Day ceremonies in Léopoldville, June 30 1960. On the right, President Kasavubu is giving his speech to the assembled dignitaries.

What is the Purpose of Tutorial 2?

- Understand how the Congolese gained their independence.
- Understand why Katanga broke away from the rest of the country.
- Identify Congo's key political personalities

Starter:

Congo is the size of Western Europe and contains some 250 **ethnic groups**. In 1960, despite wealthy and productive mines and an industrialized workforce in parts of Katanga province, the vast majority of Congolese lived in rural areas. List three reasons why these factors—or any others you may think of-- may have made it difficult to build a unified Congolese nation after independence:

1)
2)
3)

Map 5



REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO, 1960

Congo's independence from Belgium was the result of a chaotic process. By the late 1950s, many African countries had gained or were about to gain their independence (for example: Sudan, Morocco, and Tunisia in 1956, Ghana in 1957, Guinea in 1958). Moreover, fourteen territories in French-controlled Africa had been granted a substantial amount of **autonomy** from France—eventually leading to their independence in 1960. Officials in Belgium, however, thought that Congolese independence would only happen in the far future. When one of them, a man named Jef van Bilsen, wrote an article in 1955 calling for independence in 30 years, it provoked a negative reaction among Belgian leaders as well as Belgian **settlers** in Congo. Instead, the Belgian government planned for a long and gradual transition from colony to **self-government** as Congo's economy grew and newly established universities could educate a pro-Belgian Congolese **elite**.

Meanwhile, until 1956 the Belgians had not allowed the Congolese to form political parties. This meant that most **anti-colonial** or other kinds of political organization were based on ethnic groups or regions of the country. The most important leaders of these ethnic/regional associations were Joseph Kasavubu, the leader of the *Alliance des Bakongo* (known as the ABAKO)—covering a broad region of KiKongo speakers in western Congo (but also living in neighbouring Congo-Brazzaville and Angola)—and Moïse Tshombe. Tshombe led the *Confédération des associations tribales du Katanga* (CONAKAT) in the southern province of Katanga, rich in mineral deposits and productive copper, cobalt, zinc, and uranium mines.

Patrice Lumumba, on the other hand, led the *Mouvement national congolais* (MNC). Founded in 1958, it was one of the only political parties that aimed to appeal to all Congolese, regardless of their ethnic

or regional origin. This view would clash with Kasavubu, Tshombe, and others who wanted a **federal**, or **decentralized** Congo, or even separate independence for different parts of the country.

Conflict between Congolese political parties and leaders meant that each one tried to outdo the other in their opposition to Belgian rule, as well as the 30-year timeline outlined by Jef van Bilsen. All soon began to insist on immediate independence instead. Major riots broke out in Léopoldville, Congo's capital, in January 1959 by people demanding independence. Throughout the rest of the year violence and rebellions in rural areas made it difficult for Belgian authorities to maintain control. That year, it also became clear that France's African colonies would gain their independence, so pressure built up on Belgium to do the same. Realizing that the costs of keeping Congo might be too high, and wanting to avoid a bloody war, the Belgian government decided to organize a **Round Table Conference** with Congolese leaders on eventual independence. Lasting from January 20-February 20 1960 in Brussels (the capital of Belgium), the Round Table Conference ended with the decision to grant Congo its independence just four months later, on June 30 1960.

In elections held in May 1960, Lumumba's MNC party won the most votes, and Lumumba became Prime Minister. Kasavubu was given the **ceremonial** post of President. On June 30, at the ceremonies marking Congo's independence, Lumumba gave the following speech:

Men and women of the Congo,

Victorious independence fighters,

I salute you in the name of the Congolese Government.

I ask all of you, my friends, who tirelessly fought in our ranks, to mark this June 30, 1960, as an **illustrious** date that will be ever engraved in your hearts, a date whose meaning you will proudly explain to your children, so that they in turn might relate to their grandchildren and great-grandchildren the glorious history of our struggle for freedom.

Although this independence of the Congo is being proclaimed today by agreement with Belgium, an **amicable** country, with which we are on equal terms, no Congolese will ever forget that independence was won in struggle, a **persevering** and inspired struggle carried on from day to day, a struggle, in which we were **undaunted** by privation or suffering and **stinted** neither strength nor blood.

It was filled with tears, fire and blood. We are deeply proud of our struggle, because it was just and noble and **indispensable** in putting an end to the humiliating bondage forced upon us.

That was our lot for the eighty years of colonial rule and our wounds are too fresh and much too painful to be forgotten.

We have experienced forced labour in exchange for pay that did not allow us to satisfy our hunger, to clothe ourselves, to have decent lodgings or to bring up our children as dearly loved ones.

Morning, noon and night we were subjected to jeers, insults and blows because we were "Negroes". […]

We have seen our lands seized in the name of **ostensibly** just laws, which gave recognition only to the right of might.

We have not forgotten that the law was never the same for the white and the black, that it was lenient to the ones, and cruel and inhuman to the others.

We have experienced the atrocious sufferings, being persecuted for political convictions and religious beliefs, and exiled from our native land: our lot was worse than death itself.

We have not forgotten that in the cities the mansions were for the whites and the tumbledown huts for the blacks; that a black was not admitted to the cinemas, restaurants and shops set aside for "Europeans." […]

Who will ever forget the shootings which killed so many of our brothers, or the cells into which were mercilessly thrown those who no longer wished to submit to the **regime** of injustice, oppression and exploitation used by the colonialists as a tool of their domination?

All that, my brothers, brought us untold suffering.

But we, who were elected by the votes of your representatives, representatives of the people, to guide our native land, we, who have suffered in body and soul from the colonial oppression, we tell you that henceforth all that is finished with.

The Republic of the Congo has been proclaimed and our beloved country's future is now in the hands of its own people. […]

We shall stop the persecution of free thought. We shall see to it that all citizens enjoy to the fullest extent the basic freedoms provided for by the Declaration of Human Rights.

We shall eradicate all discrimination, whatever its origin, and we shall ensure for everyone a station in life befitting his human dignity and worthy of his labour and his loyalty to the country.

We shall institute in the country a peace resting not on guns and bayonets but on concord and goodwill. […]

Eternal glory to the fighters for national liberation!

Long live the independent and sovereign Congo!

Long live independence and African unity!

Lumumba giving his Independence Day speech. King Baudouin and President Kasavubu are seated on the right.

Think-Pair-Share
Read Lumumba's speech. It made him an instant hero among many Congolese, and the speech is still remembered in Congo today. King Baudouin was furious after he heard it though. Why do you think he was angry? How is Lumumba's message different from Baudouin's? Underline phrases you might think important. Discuss in class.

Crisis!
On July 5th 1960, just days after independence, the Congolese army **mutinied** against their white officers. Congolese soldiers had expected that independence from Belgium would mean they would no longer be commanded by Belgians. In their anger, soldiers began to attack white people in Léopoldville and in other parts of the country. When Lumumba and Kasavubu were unable to restrain the army, the Belgian government sent troops to Congo to end the violence. Lumumba and Kasavubu both saw this as an attack and possibly a recolonization of the country. To make matters worse, on July 11th, Moise Tshombe, the leader of the CONAKAT political party and head of the mineral-rich Katanga province, declared Katanga's own independence from Congo. Tshombe's **secession** was also supported by Belgium and major Belgian and British companies with investments in the province.

Map 6

The province of Katanga.

This is a political cartoon, appearing in the *Daily Express* on August 2nd, 1960, just a few weeks after Katanga's secession.



What is the cartoon's main message or argument?

What counterarguments might Lumumba or Kasavubu have used?

What kind of racial stereotypes does the cartoonist employ to his British audience?

Homework

President Joseph Kasavubu also gave a speech at the Independence Day ceremony. Read the excerpt below and answer the questions which follow.

Kasavubu's speech

Excellencies, my dear compatriots,
[…] We will look to develop, throughout the country, the **assimilation** that eighty years of contact with the West has brought us: [the French] language, which is the indispensable tool for harmonizing our own relationships, legislation, which has unconsciously influenced the evolution of our different customs and slowly brought them together, and finally—above all—culture. A fundamental cultural affinity already links all **Bantus** together—so contact with Christian civilization and the roots this civilization has grown in us will allow revived old blood to give an originality and particular brilliance to our cultural expression. We will be keen to promote the emergence of this national culture and help all levels of the population to perceive the message and deepen its scope. We will have an essential mission to fulfill, because culture will be the real cement of the nation.

Sire[addressing King Baudouin],

The presence of your August Majesty at the ceremonies of this memorable day constitutes a resounding and new testimony of Your concern for all those people you have loved and protected. They are happy to be able to say both their appreciation for the benefits that you and your illustrious **predecessors** have **lavished** on them, and their joy for the understanding in which you have met their **aspirations**. They have received your message of friendship with all the respect and fervor that surrounds you and will long keep in their hearts the words that you have addressed to them in this moving hour. They will appreciate the full value of the friendship that Belgium offers them and they will enthusiastically embark on the path of sincere collaboration.

Both Kasavubu and Lumumba were anticolonial nationalists. However, they disagreed on some fundamental issues. Based on their speeches:

What is one major issue they might have disagreed on?

How might you imagine it contributing to future relations between the two men?

Homework Success Criteria

Knowledge and understanding	Effectively convey an understanding of Kasavubu and Lumumba's messages and use this to answer the questions posed in the instructions.
Research and evidence	Show that you have read the two speeches.
Developing an argument	Give reasons and evidence to back up the points that you make.
Critical evaluation	Explain how the speeches relate to one another.
Structure and presentation	Make a logical argument and back it up with evidence from the sources.
Language and style	Make sure your spelling, grammar and punctuation are accurate. Use a formal style of writing that is appropriate for an academic essay.

Tutorial 3 – The United Nations

A Nigerian Police detachment of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Congo, June 1961

What is the Purpose of Tutorial 3?

- Explore the international stakes of Congo's conflicts
- Demonstrate familiarity with the UN and the Security Council
- Understand the reasons for the UN peacekeeping mission

Starter:

List three reasons why Congo gained independence in 1960.

1)
2)
3)

What were two problems faced by Lumumba and Kasavubu right after independence?

1)
2)

Faced with the double crisis of Belgian military intervention and Katangan secession, Lumumba and Kasavubu asked the **United Nations** (UN) for help. On July 12,1960, the UN **Security Council** passed Resolution 143, which called for the departure of all Belgian troops and the **deployment** of a **peacekeeping force** in Congo. This force, eventually reaching some 20,000 soldiers, was made up of soldiers from many countries (see map 7).

Map 7



UN soldiers, October 1960

Think-Pair-Share
What kind of problems might arise with having soldiers from so many different countries as part of a single peacekeeping mission?

The United Nations, however, was (and is) made up of nearly every country on earth. The most powerful of these are the five permanent members of the Security Council (sometimes referred to as the "P5"). These are the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, and China. Each of the five countries has a **veto** over any Security Council resolution. This also meant that the United Nations' **Secretary General**—the person in charge of the UN—had to be very careful about how to act so as not to anger one of the P5 or other influential countries. In Congo, this presented some major challenges, since many UN members had differing points of view about what the UN should do there.

To make things more complicated, 1960 was a time when the **Cold War** was at its height. The Cold War was an intense state of **ideological** and political tension and competition between the United States and its allies (which included Great Britain and France), and the Soviet Union and its allies. Although massed armies in Europe and nuclear weapons prevented the outbreak of war, each side deeply feared the other.

Map 8



Cold War alliances in 1959

Given the context of the Cold War, what might be the chief worry of the Americans and their allies (especially Britain and France in the Security Council) in Congo?

Watch this newsreel footage and discuss the following questions in the group:

https://www.britishpathe.com/video/u-n-troops-take-over

What are we told about the crisis in the Congo?

What does the newsreel say about the withdrawal of Belgian troops?

How does it describe the role of UN troops?

Whose perspective(s) is/are missing from the clip and its commentary?

Although UN troops began arriving within days of the Security Council resolution, Lumumba and Kasavubu quickly became frustrated that the UN refused to help end the Katangan secession. UN Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjöld, rejected requests for a UN-led effort to conquer the province. Lumumba on the other hand thought that Resolution 143 meant the UN should do so. In response, Lumumba began threatening to expel the UN and to look for help elsewhere. This included the Soviet Union.

Homework

Below is the text of UN Security Council Resolution 143. Do you think Lumumba was right to argue that it allowed UN peacekeepers to help end the Katangan secession? Or do you think the UN Secretary General was right in arguing that Resolution 143 did not give him the authority to do that?

143 (1960). Resolution of 14 July 1960

[S/4387]

The Security Council,

Considering the report of the Secretary-General[6] on a request for United Nations action in relation to the Republic of the Congo,

Considering the request for military assistance addressed to the Secretary-General by the President and the Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo,[7]

1. *Calls upon* the Government of Belgium to withdraw its troops from the territory of the Republic of the Congo;

2. *Decides* to authorize the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance as may be necessary until, through the efforts of the Congolese Government with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council as appropriate.

Adopted at the 873rd meeting by 8 votes to none, with 3 abstentions (China, France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland).

Homework Success Criteria

Knowledge and understanding	Effectively convey an understanding of UN Resolution 143 and use this to answer the questions posed in the instructions.
Research and evidence	Show that you have read the UN Resolution and understand the context in which it was passed.
Developing an argument	Give reasons and evidence from the text to back up the points that you make.
Critical evaluation	Provide an interpretation of the Resolution based on prior course knowledge and the contents of the text.
Structure and presentation	Make a logical argument and back it up with evidence from the sources.
Language and style	Make sure your spelling, grammar and punctuation are accurate. Use a formal style of writing that is appropriate for an academic essay.

Tutorial 4 – Plots against Lumumba

A grainy photograph of Larry Devlin, the chief American spy in Congo in 1960

What is the Purpose of Tutorial 4?

- Identify international intervenors and their interests
- Identify and define the role of an intelligence agency
- Understand the role of the CIA in Congo

Starter:

What does an intelligence agency do?

Patrice Lumumba and UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld

Lumumba's **denunciation** of the UN and his calls to the Soviets for help alarmed politicians all over the Western Cold War alliance, especially in the United States. Although the Soviets only sent a few transport planes to help Lumumba, the Americans, Belgians, British, and French all saw this as the beginning of a major Soviet push to get involved in Congo.

After Congolese soldiers killed several hundred civilians in a failed attempt to end the Katangan secession, UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld and American officials accused Lumumba of war crimes. Even though Lumumba had no direct role in the killings, it gave everyone an excuse to try to get rid of him.

Match the country to its foreign intelligence agency in 1960 (some are the same today):

United States	MI6
Great Britain	KGB
France	CIA
Belgium	SGR
Soviet Union	SDECE

Bonus: Which agencies have changed their names, and what are they?

Initial Belgian and American efforts concentrated on convincing President Kasavubu to sack Lumumba, as was his right under the Congolese constitution. Kasavubu himself had grown increasingly frustrated with Lumumba. In addition to a clash of personalities and egos, Kasavubu's vision of a decentralized Congo and desire for negotiations with Katangan separatists conflicted with Lumumba's vision of a unified country.

This culminated on September 5th, 1960 when Kasavubu announced over the radio that he was sacking Lumumba and replacing him with the president of the Congolese Senate, Joseph Ileo. Lumumba immediately responded by claiming the sacking was illegal and that he was now sacking Kasavubu instead. The situation was partly resolved a week later when Joseph Mobutu, the commander of the Congolese army, mounted a **coup d'état**, overthrowing Lumumba and replacing him with a handpicked group of ministers.

Mobutu briefly pushed Kasavubu to the side as well. He also tried to arrest Lumumba. However, the UN sent troops to protect him at his house. Since Congolese troops surrounded the UN troops though, Lumumba couldn't leave his home. In addition to sacking Lumumba, he claimed the Soviet Union was spreading propaganda in the Congolese army, and thus expelled all Soviet and **Eastern bloc** diplomats and officials from Congo. Larry Devlin, chief of the **Central Intelligence Agency** (CIA) station in Léopoldville, supported Mobutu in his efforts by giving him money, encouragement, and advice.

Match the country to the positions taken by its government on Lumumba and on the Katangan secession.

Foreign Country	**Views on Lumumba**	**Views on Katanga Secession**
United States		
Belgium		
United Kingdom		
France		
Soviet Union (USSR)		

Views on Lumumba
Feared that Lumumba was a Soviet ally and could invite Soviet influence into Congo. Also feared that this influence would threaten neighbouring countries or colonies.
Feared that Lumumba's fierce **nationalism** threatened investments and property, as well as foreign citizen living in Congo.
Feared that Lumumba's **nationalism** and possible Soviet connections threatened future investments and political influence.
Saw Lumumba's rise as an opportunity for spreading influence and gaining support from other **Third World** powers for standing up to colonialism and Western interference.

Views on Katanga Secession
Unofficially supported Katangan secession to protect investments and to counter Soviet influence.
Opposed Katangan secession because it encouraged Congo's disintegration which might encourage growing Soviet influence.
Opposed Katangan secession because it benefited some Western countries and because most **Third World** countries opposed it.

Mobutu's press conference following his coup d'état in September 1960. He holds an example of the propaganda he claimed the Soviets were distributing to Congolese troops.

Mobutu and Tshombe together in Elizabethville, October 1960

Seeking to find another way to end the conflict with Katanga, on October 16th, Mobutu flew to Elizabethville, Katanga's capital, for talks with Moïse Tshombe, Katanga's leader. Both leaders had reason to fear any return of Lumumba to power, and both seemed to hope some kind of deal could be made between the central Congolese government and Katanga. Tshombe offered the government in Léopoldville money, and Mobutu told Tshombe he would "neutralize Lumumba completely, and if possible physically."

Meanwhile, though the United States and Belgian governments were happy that Mobutu had temporarily removed Lumumba from the Congolese government, they worried that Lumumba might manage to organize support for a comeback. Some of his supporters were gathering in the eastern Congolese town of Stanleyville in preparation for just such a move. Both the Americans and Belgians decided that more drastic action had to be taken. Indeed, both had been working on different assassination plots since August.

Homework:

Below is a message sent from CIA headquarters in Washington DC to its station in Congo on August 27th 1960.

14. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the Station in the Congo[1]

Washington, August 27, 1960.

Dir 47587 (Out 62966).

1. In high quarters here it is the clear-cut conclusion that if [garble—Lumumba?] continues to hold high office, the inevitable result will at best be chaos and at worst pave the way to Communist takeover of the Congo with disastrous consequences for the prestige of UN and for the interests of the free world generally. Consequently we conclude that his removal must be an urgent and prime objective and that under existing conditions this should be a high priority of our covert action.[2]

2. Hence we wish to give you wider authority along lines Leop 0772[3] and Leop 0785[4] and Dir 46115[5] including even more aggressive action if it can remain covert. We realize that targets of opportunity may present themselves to you and in addition to sums heretofore authorized, we further authorize expenditure up to a total of [*dollar amount not declassified*] to carry out any crash programs on which you do not have the opportunity to consult HQS. Advise your cash needs.

Answer the following questions:

What does this telegram tell us about American fears of Lumumba?

What is meant by "covert action"?

What is meant by the "free world"?

Homework Success Criteria

Knowledge and understanding	Effectively convey an understanding of the CIA telegram and use this to answer the questions.
Research and evidence	Show that you have read the telegram and understand the context.
Developing an argument	Give reasons and evidence from the text to back up the points that you make.
Critical evaluation	Provide an interpretation of the telegram based on prior course knowledge and the contents of the text.
Structure and presentation	Make a logical argument and back it up with evidence from the sources.
Language and style	Make sure your spelling, grammar and punctuation are accurate. Use a formal style of writing that is appropriate for an academic essay.

Tutorial 5 – Murdering Lumumba



What is the Purpose of Tutorial 5?

- Understand the events that led to Lumumba's death
- Grasp the variety of actors with interests in killing Lumumba
- Evaluate the complex nature of causation in important historical events

Starter:

Why do politicians get assassinated?

On August 18th 1960, American President Dwight D. Eisenhower convened a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC)—the main decision making body on American **foreign policy.** At the meeting, the head of the CIA, Allen Dulles, claimed that Lumumba was being paid by the Soviet Union (this was not true, but the Americans didn't know it). Eisenhower worried that Lumumba would try to kick out the UN and that this could benefit the Soviet Union. According to one of the meeting's participants, he then turned to Dulles and gave an order that Lumumba should be assassinated.



US President Dwight D. Eisenhower, and CIA Director Allen Dulles

On September 19, Dulles created a top-secret communication channel to his chief spy in Congo, Larry Devlin. This channel was dedicated to conveying orders and Devlin's reports on efforts to kill Lumumba. At first, the CIA sent a man with poison to Léopoldville, with the intention of somehow getting it into Lumumba's food or toothpaste. Devlin figured though that Lumumba was too heavily guarded to make this a real possibility. Devlin tried to look for other possibilities, including using a high-powered rifle to shoot Lumumba. Ultimately though none of these plans came to fruition. Instead, Devlin hoped the Congolese would kill Lumumba themselves. Given how close Mobutu and those around him were to Devlin though, they wouldn't make any move if Devlin had tried to stop them.

There were also several Belgian efforts to assassinate Lumumba. These included poisoning Lumumba, hiring assassins to break into Lumumba's home and kill him, and kidnapping. These plans were devised by lower-level Belgian officials, including Lt. Colonel Louis Morlière who also served as Mobutu's chief military adviser. It remains unclear how directly involved the Belgian government was in these operations. However, none of these attempts actually succeeded.

On November 27th, Lumumba manage to escape his home whilst hiding in the boot of a car. He aimed to go across country and meet up with his followers in Stanleyville where he could lead a rebellion against Mobutu and Kasavubu. His escape only lasted five days however, when Mobutu's army, supported by airplanes flown by Belgians, managed to track him down and arrest him on December 2nd. Now Lumumba was in the hands of Mobutu who had every intention of killing him. However, Mobutu knew he couldn't openly kill Lumumba without losing **legitimacy**, so he had to figure out a way to have someone else do it for him.

Map 9

Lumumba's escape and capture

Lumumba's arrival at Léopoldville airport following his capture on December 2nd 1960.

Lumumba's arrival at Léopoldville following his arrest caused a sensation. As he got off the plane, Congolese soldiers viciously beat him while journalists and cameramen looked on. Newsreel footage showed the world how terrible the Congolese army treated him. Why did this upset American officials?

On January 13th 1961, Congolese soldiers at Camp Hardy, the military base where Lumumba was being held along with other political prisoners, **mutinied**. They demanded better pay, and some even tried to free Lumumba. Although Mobutu managed to bring the rebellion under control, it raised fears that Lumumba might be able to escape again. Soon Kasavubu, Mobutu, their Belgian advisers, and Belgian government officials began asking Tshombe if he would be willing to accept a transfer of Lumumba to Katanga.

Why do you think Mobutu and Belgian government ministers thought transferring Lumumba to Katanga would get rid of Lumumba as a threat?

Map 10



Lumumba's transfer to Katanga, January 17th, 1961

Larry Devlin, the head of the CIA operation in Congo, knew about the transfer, but waited to tell the American government about it until the day it happened. This prevented any effort by the American government or its representatives to stop it from happening.

Early on the morning of January 17th 1961, Lumumba and two other politicians closely linked to him, Joseph Okito and Maurice Mpolo, were put on a plane to Elisabethville, Katanga's capital. All three were again horribly beaten on the plane ride. Upon landing, they were beaten some more and taken to a nearby house, under a guard commanded by Belgian officers. While there, Tshombe and other ministers in the Katangan government stopped by and mocked Lumumba.

At 8:30 PM, Frans Vercheure, a Belgian police inspector working for the Katangan government, put the three prisoners into a car and drove them 30 miles away from Elizabethville. There he pulled off the road and ordered the men out of the car. One by one, he ordered the Katangan soldiers with him to shoot his prisoners, with Lumumba the last to die. Several days later, Gerard Soete, a Belgian police adviser had to remove the bodies and hide them far away in deeper graves. However, Tshombe and other Katangan ministers worried that the bodies would still be found and ordered Soete to get rid of them. Soete returned to the bodies, dug them up, cut them into pieces, and dissolved them in giant vats of acid.

Tshombe only made Lumumba's death public in February. The Katangan government claimed that Lumumba, Okito, and Mpolo were killed by angry villagers as they tried to escape from prison. Few people believed their story. Instead angry protests and demonstrations erupted around the world, leading to a new UN Security Council Resolution—UNSC Resolution 161, calling for the removal of Belgian advisers to the Katangan government and threatened the use of UN military force to prevent the outbreak of renewed civil war.

Even after the international outcry surrounding Lumumba's death and UNSC Resolution 161, the Katangan secession lasted for another two years—only ending as a result of UN military action in January 1963. Given what you know about Congo's politics and the international political situation of the time, why do you think it took so long to defeat Katanga?

Homework—First Draft of Final Assignment:

Instructions: Read the BBC article below on the role of Great Britain and MI6 in the assassination of Patrice Lumumba. Write a 2,000-word essay assessing the claim made in the article that MI6 "organized" the killing of Patrice Lumumba. Do you agree with it, or not?

In your essay, make sure to highlight key actors, interests at play, and the chronology of events. Feel free to make use of all the course material provided in this booklet, including the two articles in the appendix. The first is an analysis by historian Stephen Weissman of the role played by the CIA in the early years of Congo's independence. The second presents the conclusions from the Belgian government's commission of enquiry into Lumumba's death. Both contain important evidence that may be useful for you. You are also required to explore and use other source material you may find on the subject, though be careful to evaluate their reliability for use as academic evidence (no Wikipedia!).

It might be useful to structure your essay in the following way:

- State your argument—did MI6 help organize Lumumba's assassination?
- Lay out your evidence and cite your source for each element of evidence you put forward (see the appendix for information on how to cite sources).
- Explain how that evidence supports your argument about the role of MI6.
- Write a concluding paragraph summing up both your argument (whether MI6 organized Lumumba's assassination or not) and the evidence for your claim.

MI6 and the death of Patrice Lumumba

By Gordon Corera Security correspondent, BBC News
2 April 2013

A member of the House of Lords, Lord Lea, has written to the London Review of Books saying that shortly before she died, fellow peer and former MI6 officer Daphne Park told him Britain had been involved in the death of Patrice Lumumba, the elected leader of the Congo, in 1961.

When he asked her whether MI6 might have had something to do with it, he recalls her saying: "We did. I organised it."

During long interviews I conducted with her for the BBC and for a book that in part covered MI6 and the crisis in the Congo , she never made a similar direct admission and she has denied that there was a "licence to kill" for the British Secret Service.

But piecing together information suggests that while MI6 did not kill the politician directly, it is possible - but hard to prove definitively - that it could have had some kind of indirect role.

Daphne Park was the MI6 officer in the Congo at a crucial point in the country's history. She arrived just before the Congo received independence from Belgium in the middle of 1960.

'Elimination'

Congo's first elected prime minister was Patrice Lumumba who was immediately faced with a breakdown of order. There was an army revolt while secessionist groups from the mineral-rich province of Katanga made their move and Belgian paratroopers returned, supposedly to restore security.

Lumumba made a fateful step - he turned to the Soviet Union for help. This set off panic in London and Washington, who feared the Soviets would get a foothold in Africa much as they had done in Cuba.

In the White House, President Eisenhower held a National Security Council meeting in the summer of 1960 in which at one point he turned to his CIA director and used the word "eliminated" in terms of what he wanted done with Lumumba.

The CIA got to work. It came up with a series of plans - including snipers and poisoned toothpaste - to get rid of the Congolese leader. They were not carried out because the CIA man on the ground, Larry Devlin, said he was reluctant to see them through.

Murder was also on the mind of some in London. A Foreign Office official called Howard Smith wrote a memo outlining a number of options. "The first is the simple one of removing him from the scene by killing him," the civil servant (and later head of MI5) wrote of Lumumba, who was ousted from power but still considered a threat.

MI6 never had a formal "licence to kill". However, at various times killing has been put on the agenda - but normally at the behest of politicians rather than the spies.

Anthony Eden, prime minister at the time of Suez, had made it clear he wanted Nasser dead and more recently David Owen has said that as Foreign Secretary, he had a conversation with MI6 about killing Idi Amin in Uganda (neither of which came to anything).

But in January 1961, Lumumba was dead.

Did Britain and America actually kill him? Not directly. He went on the run, was captured and handed over by a new government to a secessionist group whom they knew would kill him.

The actual killing was done by fighters from the Congo along with Belgians- and with the almost certain connivance of the Belgian government who hated him even more than the American and the British.

Powerful enemies

The comments attributed to Daphne Park by Lord Lea are subtler than saying that Britain killed Lumumba.

Lord Lea claims Baroness Park told him that Britain had "organised" the killing. This is more possible.

Among the senior politicians in the Congo who made the decision to hand Lumumba over to those who eventually did kill him were two men with close connections to Western intelligence.

One of them was close to Larry Devlin and the CIA but the other was close to Daphne Park. She had actually rescued him from danger by smuggling him to freedom in the back of her small Citroen car when Lumumba's people had guessed he was in contact with her.

Do these contacts and relationships mean MI6 could have been complicit in some way in the death of Lumumba? It is possible that they knew about it and turned a blind eye, allowed it to happen or even actively encouraged it - what we would now call "complicity" - as well as the other possibility of having known nothing.

The killing would have almost certainly happened anyway because so many powerful people and countries wanted Lumumba dead.

Whitehall sources describe the claims of MI6 involvement as "speculative". But with Daphne Park dying in March 2010 and the MI6 files resolutely closed, the final answer on Britain's role may remain elusive.

Final Assignment Success Criteria

Knowledge and understanding	Use key words from the glossary in ways that demonstrate you know their meanings and how they relate to the Congo Crisis or Lumumba's assassination. Clearly explain how the evidence you use is relevant for your argument.
Research and evidence	Include research findings from a wide range of sources. As well as using the sources provided, you should be discovering some sources yourself from the independent work that you do outside tutorials.
Developing an argument	Give reasons and evidence to back up the points that you make. You might find the PEE structure helpful: Point – make the key point clear Evidence – explain the evidence for the point Explanation – explain why your point is relevant and important Make links to topics you have covered during tutorials as well as some topics that you have not discussed during tutorials.
Critical evaluation	Include evaluation of what is being described and provide clear justification and reasoning. Select relevant research evidence to back up your thinking. Be sure to keep in mind the point of view expressed by each of the sources, and whether the sources are primary or secondary.
Structure and presentation	Organise your ideas in paragraphs with a logical structure Include an introduction that clearly outlines what the assignment will contain. Include a conclusion that summarises all the key points clearly. Make sure that you have referenced everything correctly
Language and style	Make sure your spelling, grammar and punctuation are accurate. Use a formal style of writing that is appropriate for an academic essay.

Tutorial 6 – Feedback tutorial

What is the Purpose of Tutorial 6?

- To receive feedback on your final assignment
- To respond to the feedback from your Uni Pathways teacher
- To write targets for improvement on your final assignment

Final assignment feedback from your Uni Pathways Teacher

(Remember to look at the mark scheme to help you understand what you have done well so far, and how you can do even better in your final assignment)

Here are three things that my Uni Pathways Teacher thought I did well in my draft assignment
•   •   •

Here are three things that my Uni Pathways Teacher thinks that I could do to get a higher mark in my final assignment
•   •   •

Tasks from my Uni Pathways Teacher to do during the feedback tutorial to help me improve
•   •   •
My response:

Actions I will take to improve my final assignment after this tutorial…
•   •   •

Hand in date for my final assignment:	

Tutorial 7 – Final tutorial

What is the Purpose of Tutorial 7?

- To receive feedback and a grade on your final assignment.
- To reflect on the programme including what you enjoyed and what was challenging.
- To ask any questions you may have about university.

Final assignment feedback from my Uni Pathways Teacher

Final mark:	University style grade:
Feedback: Here are three things that my Uni Pathways teacher thought I did well in my final assignment • • •	

Here are three things that my Uni Pathways teacher thinks I should remember for when I am doing this kind of study in the future
• • •

University

What questions do you still have about University after taking part in Uni Pathways?
•   •   •

Reflecting on Uni Pathways

What did you most enjoy about Uni Pathways?
•   •   •

What did you find challenging about the programme?	How did you overcome these challenges?
• • •	• • •

Appendix 1 – Referencing correctly

When you get to university, you will need to include references in the assignments that you write, so we would like you to start getting into the habit of referencing in your Brilliant Club assignment. This is really important, because it will help you to avoid plagiarism. Plagiarism is when you take someone else's work or ideas and pass them off as your own. Whether plagiarism is deliberate or accidental, the consequences can be severe. In order to avoid losing marks in your final assignment, or even failing, you must be careful to reference your sources correctly.

What is a reference?

A reference is just a note in your assignment which says if you have referred to or been influenced by another source such as book, website or article. For example, if you use the internet to research a particular subject, and you want to include a specific piece of information from this website, you will need to reference it.

Why should I reference?

Referencing is important in your work for the following reasons:

- It gives credit to the authors of any sources you have referred to or been influenced by.
- It supports the arguments you make in your assignments.
- It demonstrates the variety of sources you have used.
- It helps to prevent you losing marks, or failing, due to plagiarism.

When should I use a reference?

You should use a reference when you:

- Quote directly from another source.
- Summarise or rephrase another piece of work.
- Include a specific statistic or fact from a source.

How do I reference?

There are a number of different ways of referencing, and these often vary depending on what subject you are studying. The most important to thing is to be consistent. This means that you need to stick to the same system throughout your whole assignment. Here is a basic system of referencing that you can use, which consists of the following two parts:

1. **A marker in your assignment**: After you have used a reference in your assignment (you have read something and included it in your work as a quote, or re-written it your own words) you should mark this is in your text with a number, e.g. [1]. The next time you use a reference you should use the next number, e.g. [2].
2. **Bibliography**: This is just a list of the references you have used in your assignment. In the bibliography, you list your references by the numbers you have used, and include as much information as you have about the reference. The list below gives what should be included for different sources.

    a. **Websites** – Author (if possible), title of the web page, website address, [date you accessed it, in square brackets].

    E.g. Dan Snow, 'How did so many soldiers survive the trenches?', http://www.bbc.co.uk/guides/z3kgjxs#zg2dtfr [11 July 2014].

    b. **Books** – Author, date published, title of book (in italics), pages where the information came from.

    E.g. S. Dubner and S. Levitt, (2006) *Freakonomics*, 7-9.

    c. **Articles** – Author, 'title of the article' (with quotation marks), *where the article comes from* (newspaper, journal etc.), date of the article.

    E.g. Maev Kennedy, 'The lights to go out across the UK to mark First World War's centenary', Guardian, 10 July 2014.

Appendix 2 – Additional Sources

Congo's Key Political Personalities:[1]

Patrice Lumumba (1925-1961)
Lumumba worked as a trade union organizer before founding the *Mouvement national congolais* (MNC) Congo's only nationwide political party. Briefly imprisoned in November 1959 on charges of inciting riots, in May 1960 the MNC, emerged as the strongest single party and Lumumba became prime minister of a coalition government with his rival Joseph Kasavubu, leader of the Bakongo, becoming president. Following the secession of Katanga, Lumumba sought UN support, but frustration with the UN"s reluctance to use force prompted an appeal to the Soviet Union to provide logistical support for an offensive against the secessionists. However, he was dismissed by Kasavubu in September 1960 and after refusing to step down, overthrown in a military coup led by Colonel Joseph Mobutu. In November, he was arrested and transferred to Elizabethville, Katanga, where he was murdered in January, 1961. His death caused widespread scandal throughout Africa, where he was seen as a leader of Pan-Africanism, and generated international pressure for stronger UN security measures against the secessionists.



Joseph Kasavubu (1910-1969)
First president of independent Congo (1960-1965), Kasavubu"s entry into political leadership began when he was elected president of the Bakongo tribal association (ABAKO) in 1954, and he held a number of administrative posts before agreeing to serve as president when Lumumba became prime minister in June 1960. As the US became increasingly concerned about Lumumba"s policies, Kasavubu used his presidential powers to dismiss Lumumba on 5th September and, following Mobutu"s seizure of power on 14th September, Kasavubu reached a working agreement with the army chief which saw him remain on as president until November 1965, when Mobutu mounted a second coup and installed himself as president. Although he accepted an honorary seat in the Senate, he retired to a farm in Mayombe where he died on 24th March, 1969.

[1] Text adapted from Professional Development Service for Teachers (PDST), "The Secession of Katanga," 2010.

Joseph Mobutu (1930-1997)
Mobutu served in the Belgian Congolese army and as a journalist before joining Patrice Lumumba in independence negotiations in Brussels in 1960. When independence was granted, he became chief of staff of the Congolese army. However, as tensions developed between Lumumba and Kasavubu, Mobutu backed Kasavubu and he was instrumental in the decision to turn Lumumba over to the Katanga regime. He later became Congo's dictator when the army seized power in November 1965, and remained in power until overthrown by rebel forces under Laurent Kabila in 1997.



Moise Tshombe (1919-1969)
A successful businessman, Tshombe helped to found the Conakat political grouping which advocated an independent but federal Congo. His power base was in the mineral-rich province of Katanga where he wished to stay in control. After independence in 1960 and the appointment of Patrice Lumumba as prime minister, Tshombe – supported by white mercenaries and Belgian mining interests – declared Katanga independent. When the UN intervened, Tshombe engaged reluctantly in moves at reconciliation; however, following the death of Dag Hammarskjold in a plane crash in September 1961, Tshombe came under more sustained UN pressure and was eventually forced to flee the Congo in June 1963, following the formal ending of secession in January. The spread of rebellion prompted President Joseph Kasavubu to invite him to return as prime minister in June 1964 but his presidential ambitions led to his dismissal by Kasavubu in October 1965. Following Mobutu"s coup in November, Tshombe was put on trial for treason in his absence. He was subsequently kidnapped in June 1967 and handed over to the Algerian government; he died in an Algerian prison in June 1969.

What Really Happened in Congo

The CIA, the Murder of Lumumba, and the Rise of Mobutu

By Stephen R. Weissman, *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2014

Partner in crime: Mobutu in Léopoldville, September 1960.Getty / AFP

It didn't take long for Congo's transition from Belgian colony to sovereign state to turn ugly. Both the Soviet Union and the United States were keeping a close eye on the mineral-rich country at the heart of Africa when, on June 30, 1960, it gained independence under a democratically elected government headed by Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba. A charismatic nationalist, Lumumba led the only party in parliament with a nationwide, rather than ethnic or regional, base. Within days, however, Congo's troops mutinied against their all-white officer corps (a holdover from the colonial era) and started terrorizing the European population. Belgium responded by sending forces to reoccupy the country and helping Congo's richest province, Katanga, secede. The United States, declining the appeals for help from the new Congolese government, instead threw its support behind a UN peacekeeping mission, which it hoped would obviate any Congolese requests for Soviet military assistance. But Lumumba quickly came into conflict with the UN for its failure to expel the Belgian troops and end Katanga's secession. After issuing a series of shifting ultimatums to the UN, he turned to Moscow for help, which responded by sending transport planes to fly Lumumba's troops into Katanga.

That's when the Eisenhower administration sent in the CIA. In the decades that followed, the dominant narrative in U.S. foreign policy circles portrayed the U.S. covert action in Congo as a surgical,

low-cost success. Even the 1975 U.S. Senate investigation by the Church Committee, which was heavily critical of the CIA, concluded that of the five covert paramilitary campaigns it studied, the operation in Congo was the only one that "achieved its objectives." Those who hold this view credit the U.S. government with avoiding a direct military confrontation with the Soviet Union and China while foiling the communists' attempts to gain influence over a key African country. They acknowledge that the CIA contributed to the fall of Lumumba, who lost a power struggle with Joseph Mobutu, the pro-Western head of Congo's army, in September 1960. But they maintain that even though the CIA plotted to assassinate Lumumba -- once even trying to get a recruit to poison his toothpaste or food -- it never did so, and had no hand in his eventual murder, in January 1961. They also recognize the agency's contribution to the military defeat of Lumumba's followers. As for Mobutu, who would go on to become one of Africa's most enduring and venal leaders, proponents of the orthodox account argue that his faults became clear only later, many years after CIA involvement had run its course.

Over the years, many scholars and journalists have challenged parts of this orthodoxy, and public perception has begun to catch up. But their case has been hampered by the shortage of official documentary evidence. Recently, however, new evidence has become available, and it paints a far darker picture than even the critics imagined. The key sources include files from the Church Committee, which have been slowly declassified over the last 20 years; a 2001 Belgian parliamentary investigation into Lumumba's murder; and a new volume, released last year, of Foreign Relations of the United States, the State Department series that presents a document-by-document record of U.S. decision-making. The new volume, on Congo, contains the most extensive set of CIA operational documents ever published.

We now know that even though the threat of communism in Congo was quite weak at the time of Congo's independence, the CIA engaged in pervasive political meddling and paramilitary action between 1960 and 1968 to ensure that the country retained a pro-Western government and to help its pathetic military on the battlefield. So extensive were these efforts that at the time, they ranked as the largest covert operation in the agency's history, costing an estimated $90–$150 million in current dollars, not counting the aircraft, weapons, and transportation and maintenance services provided by the Defense Department. The CIA had a hand in every one of Congo's major political turning points during the period and maintained a financial and political relationship with every head of its government. And contrary to the conclusion of the Church Committee, Lawrence Devlin, the CIA station chief in Congo for most of the period, had direct influence over the events that led to Lumumba's death.

Not only was U.S. involvement extensive; it was also malignant. The CIA's use of bribery and paramilitary force succeeded in keeping a narrow, politically weak clique in power for most of Congo's first decade of independence. And the very nature of the CIA's aid discouraged Congolese politicians from building genuine bases of support and adopting responsible policies. The agency's legacy of clients and techniques contributed to a long-running spiral of decline, which was characterized by corruption, political turmoil, and dependence on Western military intervention. So dysfunctional was the state that in 1997 it outright collapsed -- leaving behind instability that continues to this day.

PLAYING POLITICS

In the beginning, U.S. covert action in Congo was exclusively political in nature. Washington worried that Lumumba was too erratic and too close to the Soviets and that if he stayed in power, Congo could fall into further chaos and turn communist. Allen Dulles, the director of the CIA, cabled the CIA station in Léopoldville, the capital, in August 1960: "We conclude that his removal must be an urgent and prime objective and that under existing conditions this should be a high priority of our covert action." So the CIA station, in tandem with Belgian intelligence officials, subsidized two opposition senators who attempted to organize a vote of no confidence against Lumumba's government. The plan was for Joseph Kasavubu, Congo's president and Lumumba's rival, to dissolve the government after the vote

and nominate one of the senators as the new prime minister. The CIA also funded anti-Lumumba street demonstrations, labor movements, and propaganda.

But Kasavubu, encouraged by the Belgians, jumped the gun and publicly fired Lumumba two days before the vote was to be held. Lumumba responded by refusing to withdraw and continuing to dominate parliament, which would have to approve a new government. Devlin quickly found a solution to the stalemate in Mobutu, the 29-year-old army chief of staff. In two meetings, Mobutu told Devlin that he was moving troops to the capital and pleaded for U.S. help in acting against Lumumba. Devlin agreed to finance his efforts, subsequently telling CIA debriefers that, as the new Foreign Relations of the United States volume puts it, "this was the beginning of the plan for Mobutu to take over the government." On September 14, Mobutu announced that he was suspending parliament and the constitution. He sacked Lumumba and kept on Kasavubu, but now Mobutu was the power behind the throne.

The CIA rushed to his side with more money, warnings about assassination plots, and recommendations for ministerial appointments. It counseled Mobutu to reject reconciliation with Lumumba and instead arrest him and his key associates, advice Mobutu readily accepted. Devlin became not just the paymaster but also an influential de facto member of the government he had helped install. His principal vehicle was the so-called Binza Group, a caucus of Mobutu's political allies that got its name from the Léopoldville suburb where most of them lived. It included Mobutu's security chief and his foreign and finance ministers. In the months after the coup, the group consulted Devlin on major political and military matters, especially those dealing with Lumumba, who was now under house arrest but protected by UN troops.

The group almost always heeded Devlin's advice. In October, for example, Mobutu threatened to expand his power by firing President Kasavubu -- which would have deprived the government of its last shred of political legitimacy. So Devlin persuaded him to accept a compromise instead, under which Mobutu would work with a council of associates -- all paid by the CIA -- that would choose cabinet ministers for Kasavubu and control parliament. Devlin also convinced the Binza Group to drop a risky plan to attack Lumumba's UN security detail and arrest Lumumba.

On January 14, 1961, Devlin was informed by a government leader that Lumumba, who had escaped from UN protection and been captured by Mobutu's troops, was about to be transferred to the Belgian-backed secessionist province of South Kasai, whose leader had vowed to murder him. In his subsequent, January 17 cable reporting this critical contact to CIA headquarters, Devlin gave no indication that he had voiced any opposition to the plan. Given his intimate working relationship with Congo's rulers and his previous successful interventions with them concerning Lumumba, Devlin's permissive stance was undoubtedly a major factor in the government's decision to move Lumumba.

But Devlin did more than give a green light to the transfer. He also deliberately kept Washington out of the loop -- an exception for a covert program that was being closely managed by the CIA, the State Department, and the National Security Council. On the same day that he was informed of Lumumba's prospective transfer, Devlin learned that the State Department had denied his and CIA headquarters' urgent request for funds to pay off a key Congolese garrison on the verge of a mutiny that threatened to restore Lumumba to power. John F. Kennedy was to take office in six days, and the State Department considered the request "one of high policy" that should wait for the new administration to decide.

Seeing his preferred method for preventing Lumumba's comeback blocked, Devlin may have viewed the impending transfer as a promising Plan B. But he also knew that if he told headquarters about the plan, it would consult the State Department, which, given its response to his last request, would almost certainly have considered the U.S. position on the transfer a matter for the incoming administration. All of that meant that if Washington had been fully informed about the plot, it might well have tried to put the brakes on it through Devlin, the Binza Group, and their Belgian advisers.

Moreover, Devlin knew that the Kennedy transition team was reconsidering the Eisenhower administration's hard-line policy toward Lumumba. So even as he communicated with headquarters about other matters, Devlin withheld information about the planned transfer for three days, until the move was already under way. In a last-minute switch, Lumumba was sent to Katanga, the other Belgian-supported secessionist province, whose powerful interior minister had repeatedly called for his scalp. By the time Devlin's January 17 cable arrived in Washington, Lumumba had been shot dead in Katanga.

Rather than end the struggle for control of Congo, Lumumba's assassination only intensified it. In August 1961, the United States, under pressure from the UN and a pro-Lumumba state in eastern Congo, agreed that the Congolese parliament should reconvene to select a new national government. But the CIA used bribes to ensure that the new government was led by its ally Cyrille Adoula. While the resulting power-sharing deal did include some Lumumbists, as Lumumba's supporters were called, the most important positions went to members of the Binza Group (with Mobutu himself remaining head of the army).

Once Adoula was in office, the CIA provided him with a public relations firm to help him bolster his image abroad and an adviser who wrote speeches for him. The CIA also bribed parliament, the Binza Group, a labor union, and an organization of tribal chiefs to back the new leader. Meanwhile, Devlin continued to behave like a member of the government. At the Binza Group's behest, he persuaded Adoula not to make concessions to his Lumumbist deputy prime minister. When Adoula decided to fire Mobutu, Devlin convinced him to drop the idea. Adoula even asked Devlin to canvas political leaders in order to gauge his own parliamentary support. In November 1961, after only a year and a half on the job, Devlin cabled CIA headquarters that the agency could "take major credit for the fall of the Lumumba [government], the success of the Mobutu coup and considerable credit for Adoula's nomination as premier."

UP IN THE AIR

Adoula's government didn't perform as well as Washington had hoped: soldiers were forced to live off the land, avaricious officials looted the Treasury, and inflation sapped the incomes of everyone else. After Adoula removed nearly all his Lumumbist ministers and dissolved parliament in 1963, the Lumumbists returned to their home provinces and took to arms. By early 1964, their rebellion had swept across almost half the country. Alarmed by the insurgency, the Binza Group and Kasavubu decided to replace Adoula with someone they thought would deal with it more effectively: Moise Tshombe, the former secessionist leader of Katanga, whose breakaway government had murdered Lumumba in 1961. The CIA acquiesced to the change, adding tribal supporters of Tshombe and other key politicians to its existing payroll. It also added a major paramilitary thrust to its political program in Congo.

The agency endowed Tshombe's new government with an "instant air force" to defeat the rebels, who were then receiving modest advisory and financial assistance from the Chinese. The unit, composed mainly of American planes piloted by Cuban exiles, enabled the advance of white mercenaries (predominantly South Africans and Rhodesians) who were leading the Congolese government forces. In August 1964, a National Security Council committee had signed off on a plan for 41 combat and transport aircraft and almost 200 personnel (Cuban air crews and European ground maintenance workers). In early 1965, the CIA added a small navy, also staffed by Cubans, to the mix to hamper shipments of military supplies to the rebels from neighboring Tanzania across Lake Tanganyika.

Washington was joining a particularly bloody conflict. When they seized rebel-held areas, the white mercenaries and government forces indiscriminately slaughtered the rebels and civilians they found there. Although there was no systematic counting of the casualties, it is estimated that at least 100,000 Congolese perished during this phase of the war. The insurgents killed about 300 Americans and Europeans whom they had taken hostage following the fall of Stanleyville, the rebel capital.

By the fall of 1965, the Congolese army and its foreign helpers had largely succeeded in regaining control of the country, but another threat loomed: increasing political competition between President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Tshombe. Both the U.S. government and the Binza Group feared that the conflict between the two men could cause one of the contenders to look for support from the more radical African regimes. As the crisis reached its apogee, Mobutu told Devlin that he was considering launching another coup, to replace both Kasavubu and Tshombe, or finding some other unidentified solution. On November 22, the United States responded by increasing CIA financing for Mobutu's officers and giving Mobutu carte blanche to act as he saw fit.

Within three days, Mobutu bloodlessly seized power, a result that Devlin called "the best possible solution." The CIA responded with still more money, which Mobutu used to pay off key officers, political leaders, and tribal chiefs. Throughout 1966 and 1967, the agency forwarded Mobutu intelligence about threats to his regime, uncovering a number of major plots (one of which ended with the public hanging of the alleged conspirators). And the CIA's covert air force, along with overt transportation help from the Pentagon, helped Mobutu fend off two mercenary-led mutinies.

In October 1966, Mobutu threw out the U.S. ambassador for failing to show enough respect for his newly elevated status and stopped requesting his monthly CIA stipend. Two years later, Mobutu changed his mind and asked the CIA for more money -- which he got. By then, the CIA had wrapped up its paramilitary program and limited its political funding to four key people other than Mobutu. From the U.S. perspective, with no more legal opposition to control and no more Lumumbist rebels or pro-Tshombe mercenaries to fight, Congo could be transitioned to purely overt U.S. military and economic assistance.

Hands tied: Lumumba's capture in Léopoldville, December 1960.Bettman / Corbis

THE DAMAGE DONE

Unfortunately, the full picture of the CIA's involvement in Congo remains partly obscured. Concerned about protecting its sources and methods, the agency managed to delay the publication of the new volume of Foreign Relations of the United States for over a decade. And the version that was finally

released takes an overly cautious approach to redactions, withholding four documents in their entirety, cutting 22 by more than a paragraph, omitting the financial costs of specific activities, and attempting to guard the identities of the CIA's key Congolese clients besides Mobutu. Five decades after the events in question, most of these excisions seem hard to justify, especially given that historians, journalists, and even Devlin himself have already exposed the main actors' identities.

Still, it is clear that the CIA programs of the 1960s distorted Congolese politics for decades to come. This is not to argue that in the absence of U.S. meddling, Congo would have established a Western-style representative government. But even in a region with plenty of autocracies, the country has stood out for its extreme dysfunction. Ever since the CIA's intervention, Congo's leaders have been distinguished by a unique combination of qualities: scant political legitimacy, little capacity for governing, and corruption so extensive that it devours institutions and norms. In the years following U.S. covert action, these qualities led to economic disaster, recurrent political instability, and Western military intervention. Finally, in 1997, rebels headed by a former Lumumbist and backed by military forces from Rwanda, Uganda, and Angola sent Mobutu packing, leading to a regional war that would kill more than three and a half million people over the next decade.

Of course, the main author of all of this misrule was Mobutu. But given that he would never have been able to consolidate control were it not for the CIA cash he distributed to his allies, as he himself admitted to the agency, the United States must bear some responsibility for what Mobutu wrought. Furthermore, the CIA's predominant techniques -- corruption and external force -- constituted a tutorial on irresponsible governance. Weaned on the agency's bribery, Mobutu and his associates never had to compete for the affection of the broader public and develop a real political base and had no incentive to put the state's resources to good use. And because Mobutu could depend on the CIA's paramilitary support, he felt no pressure to develop even a minimally capable military. In fact, even though he managed in the chaos of independence to be appointed army chief of staff, he was an incompetent military leader. By 1964, his army had, according to Averell Harriman, the U.S. undersecretary of state for political affairs, proved its "worthlessness," being incapable of securing key territory without help from foreign mercenaries. What Mobutu was immensely talented at, of course, was the skill that the Americans had taught him: wheedling bribes. Twice, he even persuaded Devlin to reimburse him for army funds that he claimed to have used for unauthorized expenses or CIA objectives, arguing that if rivals discovered the misuse, they might charge him with corruption.

U.S. officials outside the CIA learned of Mobutu's flaws early on. Following the 1965 coup, a State Department memorandum cautioned, "It is too early to discern where Mobutu will draw the line between corruption and the 'normal' use of payments and patronage to facilitate government operations."

During the white mercenary mutinies of 1966 and 1967, U.S. cables and memorandums were scathing. A National Security Council memo to the White House chief of staff described Mobutu as "somewhat inept and his chances of pulling the Congo up by its bootstraps are indeed remote."

The U.S. ambassador to Congo, Robert McBride, labeled Mobutu "irrational" and "highly unstable." President Lyndon Johnson's national security adviser at the time, Walt Rostow, called him "an irritating and often stupid" man who "can be cruel to the point of inhumanity." In 1968, McBride sent a cable to the State Department that took note of the president's new luxury airplane, plan for parks modeled on Versailles, thoughts of building a replica of Saint Peter's Basilica in each of Congo's three largest cities, and acquisition of a Swiss villa. McBride concluded,

I believe there is nothing which can be done to restrain these frivolous Presidential expenditures because Mobutu has apparently risen in souffle-like grandiloquence. I feel that to call his attention to the dangers of this type of thing . . . would be to incur instant wrath.

However, I felt a brief report should be made on [this] regrettable phenomenon because I believe it is the most serious problem facing Congo at present time and the fault is that of the President and the uncontrollable spending is emanating directly from him. Furthermore, it occurred to me this might have an effect on US policies towards the present regime in the Congo.

OUR MAN

What McBride seemed not to realize was that eight years of covert action had done much to rule out any alternative U.S. policy, then or ever. The CIA had not only fostered a regime; it had stamped it "made in America" for future policymakers in Washington. As Mobutu's government lurched from crisis to crisis, it continued to enjoy U.S. and Western financial and military help. Over the years, many in Congress and some dissidents in the State Department did urge the U.S. government to push for economic and political reforms in the country that Mobutu had renamed Zaire in 1971. Failing that, they said, it should distance itself from Mobutu and cultivate political ties with the opposition. When the Cold War ended, Congress finally cut off military and nonhumanitarian assistance. Yet even afterward, as the regime entered its death throes, U.S. officials could not bring themselves to abandon it and support the peaceful democratic transition proposed by the rising opposition.

Clinging to a longtime friendly dictator, even as his flaws become more risky for U.S. interests, is a well-known pathology of U.S. foreign policy. In the case of Congo, the relationship had been created and nurtured by CIA covert action. This endowed it with a special aura of intimacy, visible in the possessive language that U.S. officials used when referring to Mobutu. For Devlin, Mobutu became "almost our only anchor to the windward." During the escalating battle between Kasavubu and Tshombe, Harold Saunders, a member of the National Security Council staff, wrote that Mobutu should be the one to resolve the conflict -- by military means if necessary -- because "he is already our man." Ten years after the subsequent coup, Edward Mulcahy, the deputy assistant secretary of state for African affairs, testified in Congress, "We do have . . . a warm spot in our hearts for President Mobutu. At a time when our aid and advice were critical for the development of Zaire, he was good enough -- and I might say wise enough -- to accept our suggestions and our counsel to the great profit of the state."

Like other such questionable commitments, the United States' long support for Mobutu was rationalized as necessary because there was no alternative but chaos. In reality, Washington squandered opportunities to push for major reforms. After Congolese exiles from Angola unsuccessfully invaded Zaire twice in the late 1970s, the United States failed to use the leverage provided by the resulting Western military intervention to seek a more inclusive government. During the opposition ferment that swept Zaire in the 1980s, it refused to support the popular demand for a second party. Even when a strong democracy movement compelled Mobutu to make political concessions in the early 1990s, the George H. W. Bush administration prevented Herman Cohen, its assistant secretary of state for African affairs, from calling for Mobutu's resignation after Mobutu reneged on his commitments. And although the Clinton administration banned visas for Mobutu's associates, it also endorsed his laughable plan for "free elections."

Covert action produced a Congolese government that largely supported U.S. foreign policy, but it burdened U.S. diplomacy in Africa for decades. In particular, the overthrow and murder of Lumumba and the support for Tshombe's white mercenaries angered African nationalists and soured U.S. relations with many key countries, including Algeria, Ghana, Kenya, and Tanzania; these actions also antagonized liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. The resentment and suspicion that the CIA's program in Congo engendered subsided slightly as the agency's involvement there declined, but they never disappeared, and they would resurface throughout the 1970s and 1980s whenever the West (and in particular the CIA) intervened in the region.

A COMMUNIST CONGO?

The root of the CIA's intervention in Congo was an overhyped analysis of the communist threat. Congo scholars have long been skeptical of the notion that had Lumumba stayed in power, his government would have fallen under the sway of the Soviet Union or China. At the time, even some U.S. officials had doubts. In 1962, shortly after he retired as director of the CIA, Dulles admitted, "I think that we overrated the Soviet danger, let's say, in the Congo." The Kennedy administration's initial policy paper, soon modified, advocated a broad-based government of "all principal political elements in the Congo," to be followed by the release of Lumumba. Even at the height of the rebellion, in 1964, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy wrote Johnson, "What is very unclear is how deep the Chinese hand is in the rebel efforts. Harriman thinks it is pretty deep; most of the intelligence community thinks it is more marginal." In November 1964, Michael Hoyt -- the U.S. consul in rebel-held Stanleyville, who had just been released from over three months of captivity -- informed policymakers that the leaders of the Lumumbist insurgency were "within the Congolese political spectrum" and that they were "essentially pragmatic and followed their own interests."

The skeptics were right: Lumumba was never a communist, and he would not have yielded to foreign control. He and his supporters had cut their political teeth in the struggle against colonialism, and they found any form of external domination anathema. They were far more interested in nonalignment, and the foreigners they identified with were other African independence leaders, not Khrushchev or Mao. Lumumba and his followers also understood that the communist world could never replace the massive European investment and 10,000 Belgian technicians that served as the foundation for Congo's Western-oriented economy. Even when they accepted Soviet military assistance to help reunify their country or contest their political exclusion, they continued to appeal for support from the United States, the rest of the West, and other African countries. Yet Washington refused to help.

Archives from the former Soviet bloc confirm that although Moscow was eager to squeeze every propaganda advantage it could from the West's difficulties in Congo, it understood that Lumumba and his followers were no Marxists, and it hedged its support for them accordingly. Following Mobutu's 1960 coup, Moscow meekly withdrew its airplanes and military advisers from the country and did nothing to help Lumumba. It provided little aid to his successors until Lumumba's assassination and the capture of Stanleyville by white mercenaries outraged the rest of Africa. Even then, the Soviet Union dispatched arms but no advisers to teach the recipients how to use them. Soviet and Chinese military assistance were also constrained by the need to secure transport rights through neighboring African states, which was not always forthcoming.

In retrospect, it is clear that the U.S. officials directing Congo policy inappropriately projected their Cold War experiences in Europe, Asia, and Latin America onto Africa, where the conditions were completely different. In Congo, there had been no Soviet military occupation and no significant Marxist or communist party or cadres. Tragically, Washington spurned an alternative policy: engaging diplomatically with Lumumba and his successors as part of a broad effort to keep the Cold War out of Congo. Instead, it annointed Mobutu and other members of the Binza Group as Belgium's heirs. Impatient and inexperienced as he was, Lumumba represented his country's best hope for a successful postcolonial era. There is every reason to believe that working with him and other incipient democratic forces would have better served both the United States and Congo.

Parliamentary Committee of enquiry in charge of determining the exact circumstances of the assassination of Patrice Lumumba and the possible involvement of Belgian politicians

THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE ENQUIRY COMMITTEE

INTRODUCTION

When reading, thinking about and discussing this case, it should be recognised that people will always tend to analyse and comment on the facts from their current perspective on the world and current institutions.

The period investigated runs from 1960 to 1961
Although the fundamental principles of democracy and international policies were also valid then, it is useful to look at the historical context because from certain points, the standards, ethics and norms of international politically correct thinking were different then, than they are today.

Circumstances in Belgium were different then. Belgian politics, institutions, the elite and the media functioned differently then, than they do nowadays.

The international situation was also radically different. We should not forget that the events occurred during the Cold War. Every action taken by a country or its leaders was noted and analysed, sometimes to an absurd degree, in the light of the international situation and the fight against communism. The reports of the national security and intelligence services and also the reports of the council of ministers and the media clearly illustrate this.

It is also important not to forget the political climate and media coverage of that time. Belgian public opinion had been confronted for days, via written and audiovisual media, with reports of tragic events of murder and rape, coming from refugees who had fled, forced to leave all their possessions behind.

In wide sections of the population, one person was held responsible: Patrice Lumumba. The population demanded a very strong response from the government.

The events were part of a process of decolonisation, which is essentially discordant and for which no easy to use formulae were present. This process of decolonisation started on the African continent at the beginning of the fifties.

The Belgian government of the fifties largely underestimated the decolonisation issue. It should also be noted that the decolonisation process in the Congo was being completed at a very fast pace. As early as 1955, Professor Van Bilsen suggested a gradual approach. Only after the riots in January 1959, did Congolese independence become a political possibility for Belgium. Five months after the Brussels' conference during which preparations were started for independence, it was a fait accompli.

The fact that independence was granted in great haste, without a thorough reflection on the necessary conditions to make this process successful, is undoubtedly rooted in the growing call for immediate independence, stemming from the Congolese leaders themselves, on the one hand, and the fear of the economic and human impact of a war of independence for Belgium, on the other. The experience of France in Algeria and Indo-China undoubtedly influenced the decision process in this matter. The Belgian government deemed a speedy independence necessary in order to protect Belgian interests against foreign influences.

It is clear that the swift shift in the Congo from a colonial to a sovereign country did not correspond with the development of the mentality of some Belgians, which remained characterized by a colonial thinking pattern for a long time.

It is not the intention of the commission to undervalue the American or UN interventions. They are simply referred to when significant in explaining Belgian attitudes or actions.

I. THE FIGHT AGAINST LUMUMBA

Although the Congo had become an independent and sovereign state on June 30 1960, we must state that this did not stop Belgium and a number of other countries from intervening directly in their internal affairs. However, a distinction must be made where the humanitarian actions of the Belgian government to protect Belgian citizens in the Congo straight after the independence are concerned.

Although the non-intervention principle was only added to the universal regulations following the United Nations resolutions, accepted by the General Assembly in 1965, 1970 and 1981, this principle was part of international legislation in 1960. As such, the General Assembly of the United Nations asks in resolution 290 (IV) dd. 1 December 1949 the States:

> *"to refrain […] from any direct or indirect action intended to jeopardize the freedom, the independence or the integrity of any state, to incite any State to internal struggle"* (§ 4) [translation].

In resolution 1236 (XII) dd. 14 December 1957, the General Assembly of the United Nations reminds them *to develop amicable and tolerant relationships, based on e.g. non-intervention in the internal affairs of the States* (3e considerans) [translation].

It is a fact that these principles were only clarified in 1965 in the Declaration of the General Assembly of the United Nations concerning the unacceptability of intervention in the internal affairs of the States, and they were added as such to the Declaration of the General Assembly of the United Nations dd. 24 October 1970 on the principles of international law concerning amicable relationships and collaboration between the States in accordance with the United Nations' Charter. Yet, it is assumed that these texts remain limited to a codification of existing common law.

On the other hand, we must state that because of the Treaty for Friendship, Assistance and Collaboration, even after 30 June a specific relationship existed between the independent Republic of the Congo and the Kingdom of Belgium. Due to the presence of large numbers of Belgian officials and officers a close connection remained. Furthermore, a large majority of these officials and officers felt they were expected to play an important role in the construction of the new state. In reality, their intentions and their superiors were not always clear, although the statute provided the accessibility of the Congolese government. This statute was established in article 250 of the *loi fondamentale* of 19 May 1960 and for its application certain agreements were required, as determined in the Treaty of Friendship.

A. Political Elimination

Lumumba was and remains a striking yet controversial personality. He was called a Satan by some, and honoured as a true people's hero by others. The latter mythologized Lumumba after his death. Indeed, it is a fact that he was the first democratically elected Prime Minister of the Congo.

The different speeches of 30 June 1960 confirmed the mutual distrust between Lumumba and the Belgian government, which undoubtedly influenced their reactions to the subsequent events. From the beginning of the crisis, which came as a surprise to the Belgian government, it was clear that it led to a fundamental split between Lumumba and the government and that gradually, not only the Belgian government, but also many other governments and many layers of Belgian and Congolese society were campaigning, some in a more co-ordinated fashion than others, to bring about Lumumba's downfall politically. Public reaction to the events of July 1960 supported the Belgian government in its actions, especially where military intervention was concerned. From a humanitarian point of view, it was certainly a necessity and subsequently the UN did not consider it aggression. However, the UN did ask for the troops to be withdrawn.

As indicated, the Belgian government found itself pressurised by public opinion which was very harshly opposed to the events in the Congo after independence, even though the government did not always completely and correctly keep them informed; it was hard for the government to justify a laissez-faire attitude regarding the tens of thousands of Europeans in the Congo and it was also worried about the financial and economic losses the Congo crisis could cause. The stakes were high for the Belgian financial groups in the Congo. Repeatedly, this was brought to the attention of the executive branch of the government.

Between 10 and 14 July, following the beginning of the Belgian military intervention and the interruption of diplomatic relations, there was a spiral of mutual accusations, leading to a complete split. During that period, the Belgian government – convinced of the fact that it no longer had to consider the Lumumba government – attempted to influence the creation of a new Congolese government:

— Minister of Foreign Affairs Wigny sent diplomat André Wendelen to the Congo to talk to Bomboko about a “coup”;

— Minister Ganshof van der Meersch sent a state security agent to the Congo (Athos) to “work behind the scenes”, aiming at political destabilisation.

In general, it can be said that from the beginning, the Belgian government showed little respect for the sovereign status of the Congolese government.

In the battle against the Lumumba government, the Belgian support to Katanga and the Tshombe government was an important element. Its purpose was not so much the secession itself, but a confederal reorganisation of the Congo, aimed at removing the economic base of power from Lumumba and his Unitarian MNC movement. Belgian support for the secession of South Kasaï and the plans for a federal or confederal Congo must be seen from the same angle. This policy took shape in the Belgian Technical Mission in Elisabethstad, led by Harold d’Aspremont Lynden. This mission played an important role in the development of the legal and military structures of Katanga as well as for the information and intelligence services. At a later date, the mission was converted into a more limited bureau-conseil, reporting to the Minister of African Affairs while the consul reported to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The policy of the Secretary General of the UN, Hammarskjöld, who led his UN troops into Katanga on 5 August, but ignored the Tshombe government, hastened the fall of Lumumba.

In order to finance the policy against the Lumumba government, the Belgian government appealed to so-called secret funds, only some of which were approved by Parliament. The commission has traced at least 50 million Belgian francs (the equivalent of 270 million Belgian francs at its current value, according to the evolution of consumption index as reported by the Belgian National Bank). This money was used to support the opposition press and politicians, to finance radio campaigns (radio-Makala) and undercover operations. These so-called secret funds were managed by the cabinets of the subsequent Ministers of African Affairs. It is impossible to find the origin of this sum, approximately fifty million francs.

These actions, supported by the Belgian government, were only part of the “Belgian opposition” against the Lumumba government. The secession of Katanga would have been impossible without the support of the Union Minière, which made the secession financially possible by paying taxes to the Tshombe government. Besides Union Minière in Katanga, there was similar action from the Forminière in South Kasaï. Due to the loss of the tax income from Katanga and South Kasaï, the Lumumba government lost nearly all of its financial power. Katanga and the Union Minière were linked in other ways as well: the mining company controlled schools and hospitals, bridges and roads on the territory of its concessions. Furthermore, it is a fact that the Union Minière tried to finance military or paramilitary groups in order to defend its interests in the fight against the armed disciples of Lumumba.

The Belgian action against the Lumumba government gained momentum during the second half of August. During that period, the Belgian General Consulate in Brazzaville (Dupret) played an important

role in encouraging the opposition or in providing logistic support. At that same time, Prime Minister Eyskens asked President Kasavubu, via his advisor Jef van Bilsen, to sack Lumumba. Minister Wigny gave, via his diplomats Westhof and Davignon, legal advice to president Kasavubu regarding such an operation. In a note, dd. 12 September 1960, the Cabinet of African Affairs explicitly admits to supporting two networks in Leopoldstad that came to an agreement on the request of the department. One of the networks involved union leaders, another academics. The presence of people with widely differing motivations indicates the different character and the divergent motives of the opposition against Lumumba.

The Belgian action is only one element in a wider group of opposition forces. Crucial to the final fall of Lumumba was the split between the Congolese Prime Minister and the UN Secretary General Hammarskjöld, because it forced Lumumba on the one hand to (openly) ask for the support of the Soviet Union and on the other hand encouraged the United States (behind the scenes) to organise active opposition against Lumumba (with the first plans of physical elimination). The US feared the disintegration of UN power, which would open the door to the Soviet Union. Pressure from US diplomats and the UN was an important factor in the deposition of Lumumba.

The activities of the Commission have been aimed at detecting possible Belgian responsibilities in the murder of Patrice Lumumba. But it is clear that a Belgian, or even an American action had little or no chance of success without the existence of internal opposition within the Congo itself. This opposition became manifest at quite an early stage, in public campaigns by famous opponents of Lumumba, such as Bolikango and
Kalonji, who had many supporters in Leopoldstad. Certain sources indicate the important role these would have played in the mutiny by the Force Publique that began shouting hostile slogans against Lumumba.

The antagonism between the Conakat of Thsombe and Munongo and the MNC of Lumumba is part of the origins of the Katanga secession. After the disruption of diplomatic relations with Belgium, the Congolese Senate, with prominent figures such as Ileo and Adoula, became an institution where the policies of the Lumumba government and especially the information policies of Minister Kashamura were criticised. The policies of Kashamura also met with resistance in religious environments, while economic policies were opposed by syndical groups (Christian as well as others). Increasingly, the opposition became extra-legal in character, as the Lumumba government started using exceptional measures to maintain its position (press censoring and extraordinary courts). During the second half of August, a more violent opposition arose out of groups of Jabako and Jepuna, who formed militias following the example of the Lumumba Youth. The ANC campaign against the secession of South Kasaï re-ignited the internal contradictions in the Congo and eventually led to a split between Lumumba and Kasavubu.

The Congo crisis was also an internal crisis within a vast country which was extremely diverse on all levels and in which all the centrifugal forces gained strength after the colonial government was dispensed with and because of the lack of solid national parties, a solid administration and a disciplined army.

The aforementioned shows that different factors, domestic as well as foreign, can be shown to have contributed to the deposition of Prime Minister Lumumba on 5 September 1960.

After 5 September, there was a period of great confusion. Lumumba refused to step down and the new Prime Minister Ileo was unsuccessful in consolidating his position. Colonel Mobutu “neutralised” both camps and appointed his College of Commissioners-General. This action came as a surprise to the Belgian government. Mobutu had not yet become strong on a political level and he did not have the unanimous support of the army. In Leopoldstad, the rivalling powers managed to reach a modus vivendi: Kasavubu, Bomboko and Mobutu united in their battle against Lumumba. From the beginning, the Belgian government had openly and enthusiastically supported Kasavubu and Ileo, even though diplomatic links with Congo had not yet been resumed. It re-opened diplomatic channels, gave political and legal advice, insisted that Kasavubu appoint his ministers, led Ileo to take action and even financed the printing, in Belgium, of the Congolese Law Gazette, containing the steps necessary for the deposition of Lumumba.

During this period, the Belgian government was especially concerned about the actions of Lumumba. After having given its support to the deposition of Prime Minister Lumumba, it was eager to prevent him from returning to power and this was a real possibility. The first and most important measure in relation to this, insisted upon by the Belgian government, was the arrest of Lumumba. *("mettre hors état de nuire"* as Minister Wigny put it).

When, finally, Mobutu took action to arrest Lumumba on 10 October, which he had always refused to do until that time, it was in exchange for a Belgian promise to provide technical and military support to the *Armée Nationale Congolaise* (ANC). The Belgian government was opposed to all possible forms of reconciliation, direct or indirect, between the Congolese leaders. The expression "élimination définitive" by Minister d'Aspremont Lynden on 6 October 1960 - in a telex to the ambassador Rothschild in Elisabethstad - should be seen from this perspective.

B. **Physical elimination**

Belgian intervention, aimed at the political elimination of Lumumba, was combined with other actions, often described as 'covert actions'.

The Commission wishes to make a clear distinction between political opposition sub A and attempts to physically liquidate Lumumba.

1. *Schemes and unfinished projects*

It is absolutely clear: there were plans to kill Lumumba.

With regard to these plans, the experts have made a thorough analysis of the role of Loos and Marlière. Major Jules Loos was the military advisor of the Ministry of African Affairs, Lieutenant colonel Louis Marlière, the ex-officer of the *Force Publique,* who had stayed in Brazzaville and become the advisor of Colonel Mobutu at the beginning of October. Both were operating under the cover of Minister d'Aspremont Lynden. An analysis of their telexes shows that they were involved in:

- weapon deliveries;
- supporting the arrest of Lumumba;

- action 58316, the outline of which is unclear but within which an attack on Lumumba could be relevant (within the same scenario, we can also see the actions of ex-resistance member Edouard Pilaet);

- the kidnapping of Lumumba. Commander Noël Dedeken was given the order to do so by General Charles Cumont, Chief of Staff of the Belgian army, via Major Loos. In Brazzaville, he was supported by Marlière.

During that same period there were – besides three American – also Belgian "plans" aimed at the physical elimination of Lumumba. A first indication was before 5 September 1960, when the creation of an "*Opération-L"* was suggested, a plan within the framework of which a substitution of medicinal drugs was proposed. We do not know the initiator(s) but they were possibly agents of the former Belgian-Congolese security services. At the beginning of October, a journalist, Bogaerts, claimed to have come to the Congo to kill Lumumba. During the first half of November, and on the instruction of Jo Gérard, a hired assassin was sent to the Congo: the Greek "Georges".

The first two plans to kill Lumumba were not followed up by even the beginning of preparations. The second plan was merely grandiloquence from the person who had concocted it. Jo Gérard's plan was started but failed due to fraud.
In addition, the Commission discovered that:

— Belgian officials helped with the execution of certain plans in Brazzaville and Leopoldstad;

— there was no trace of an order or action to rescind these plans;

— no disciplinary measures were taken against the officials – diplomats, officers or security agents – who knew about these plans or participated in them and who did not refer back to the political responsibility of a Minister.

2. *The murder of Lumumba, Mpolo and Okito in Elisabethstad*

During the investigation it was found that the telex traffic does not mention Mpolo and Okito. They apparently appeared accidentally in the airport. It must be noted, though, that in the case of a change of power Mpolo was an opponent of Mobuto and Okito was in line to take the position of Kasavubu.

From a very early stage, two facts are certain. The Belgian government tried to take Lumumba prisoner and transfer him to Katanga. Following the instructions of the competent ministers and their cabinets, the Belgians in Leopoldstad and Brazzaville tried to realise these objectives. It must be noted that the Belgian advisors in Katanga had always been negative in their advice to the Katanga government about such a plan because they considered it to be dangerous to the position of Katanga.

Apart from one exception (the telex from Dupret to Belext, Brazza 64, 17 January 1961), in the numerous telexes about the transfer to Katanga, before the beginning of the actual operation, there were no signs of concern about the physical safety of Patrice Lumumba.

Although Lumumba was arrested following an arraignment order dd. September 1960 and based on precise charges, in the heavy telex traffic after his deposition, during his actual imprisonment in the official residence, when he fled, during his imprisonment in the army camp of Thysstad, after his transfer to Katanga, the Belgian government authorities never insisted on a trial. In a constitutional state it is an essential rule that no-one should be taken prisoner except on the order of a judge or after the decision of a court.

In any event, a Member of Parliament pointed out to the Ministers who were involved in a debate in the Commission of Foreign Affairs on 13 December 1960 that there was a possible threat to the life of Lumumba in Katanga. Van Eynde substantiated this by referring to an order Munongo had given the platoon chefs of the Katangan gendarmerie on 13 August (« […] *s'il arrivait à entrer au Katanga d'une façon ou d'une autre, il doit, en ce cas, disparaître* »).

It must also be noted that because of his stay in Katanga between July and August 1960, Minister d'Aspremont, being the head of the Belgian Technical Mission, should have been able to make a good personal assessment of the state of mind of the Katangan leaders and the risk to Lumumba of his transfer there. Furthermore, in Major Loos, his military advisor, the Minister had an active co-worker who had experience in the Congo and excellent contacts in Katanga. Finally, it is also relevant to mention that many Belgian advisors, diplomats or officials were received at the Cabinet of the Ministry of African Affairs after they temporarily returned from Leopoldstad, Brazzaville or Elisabethstad.

On at least one occasion, the Head of State received an indication that the life of Lumumba was in danger; in a letter from Major Weber to the head of the King's Cabinet. It has been proven that the King was aware of this letter.

No signs of disapproval or concern were given to Major Weber, nor to President Tshombe or the Congolese authorities in Leopoldstad about the possible physical elimination of Lumumba. No evidence has been found that either the government or the competent ministers were informed of this letter.

After the arrival of Lumumba in Katanga, which came as a surprise to the Belgian Counsellors, they adopted an attitude of anticipation. There is no evidence, however, that they were involved with, or consulted during the decision-making process, which eventually led to the execution. Neither are there any indications that actions were taken to prevent the execution, which took place less than five hours after his arrival.

Lumumba was killed on the orders of the Katangan authorities which had also agreed with the transfer. Although it is impossible to indicate at what time and how the decision of the Katangan authorities to kill Lumumba and his allies Mpolo and Okito was made, this act can only be regarded as premeditated murder – a crime that was prepared and executed in a systematic way.

The execution occurred in presence of Katangan ministers and was carried out by Katangan gendarmes or police officers, in the presence, though, of a Belgian police commissioner and three Belgian officers who were under the authority, leadership and supervision of the Katangan authorities.

At no time, did the Belgian government protest to the Katangan government against the unlawful execution of Lumumba, M'polo and Okito, nor did they express regret or disapproval in relation to it.

Even when at least some members of the government were aware of the execution, every involvement with the transfer and every knowledge of the fate of Lumumba was still denied when confronted by public opinion as well as during private meetings with NATO partners.

Conclusion:

— With regard to the exact circumstances of the murder of Patrice Lumumba: after a thorough analysis, it is highly probable that Lumumba was executed in the jungle on 17 January 1961 between 9.40 pm and 9.43 pm, within 5 hours after his arrival in Katanga (for a more detailed description, the commission refers to the experts' report).

— Regarding the possible involvement of Belgian politicians:

– The transfer of Lumumba to Katanga was organised by the Congolese authorities in Leopoldstad, supported by Belgian government authorities, especially the Ministers of Foreign and African Affairs and their colleagues.

Belgian advisors in Leopoldstad collaborated with the organisation of the transfer.

– No single document, of which the commission is aware, indicates that the Belgian government or a member thereof gave the order to physically eliminate Lumumba.

– The investigation does not show that the Belgian authorities premeditated the murder of Lumumba when it attempted to transfer him to Katanga.

– It is very clear, though, that the physical safety of Lumumba was of no concern to the Belgian government. It deemed the safety of Lumumba less important than other interests.

– By not considering the possible risks of the transfer, not asking guarantees for his physical safety or insisting on humane treatment and a trial, the Belgian government and especially the Minister of African Affairs showed a lack of forethought and a lack of respect for the constitutional state.

– After hearing about the events of 17 January, the government, or at least certain members of it, acted irresponsibly by opting to spread lies to the public and all its allies. This attitude inevitably raised doubts about the role of the Belgian authorities.

Considering the preceding, the current norms regarding public morality and, without considering the personal and moral considerations of that time, the commission concludes that certain members of the Belgian government and other Belgian participants were morally responsible for the circumstances leading to the death of Lumumba.

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